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In the twentieth century the debate over the 
ideological origins of the founding period and early 
republic has resulted in a polarization of historical 
interpretations. Recently, the conflict has centered on 
historians who use either the liberal or classical 
republican paradigms to explain these eras. Scholars of the 
founding period have argued for the dominance of one 
political ideology or the other in the thought of important 
figures of this time. Unfortunately, this struggle has led 
to a narrow interpretation of arguably the greatest thinker 
in American History, James Madison. To the contrary, I hold 
Madison's thought was influenced by both liberal and 
classical republican ideas, and in this thesis I explore 
that interpretation. 
The bulk of the primary sources upon which this thesis 
rests come from the most current edition of Madison's 
writings, a fifteen volume set that runs through 1795. 
Contrary to conventional methods of analyzing Madison's 
thought that stress his famous public works, in particular 
The Federalist, this thesis gives Madison's private 
correspondence equal attention on the grounds that in them 
Madison elaborated his ideas most fully. Using such an 
approach led to an interpretation of Madison as both a 
liberal and republican thinker. In this regard I present 
his thought as sui generis and influenced by more than one 
ideology. 
The organization of the thesis is governed by my 
presentation of Madison as sui generis. In chapter two, 
2 
where I discuss Madison's thought on the nation's security, 
the republican Madison comes to the forefront. On this 
point, he combined English Opposition convictions about the 
need for a vigilant citizenry with complementary republican 
ideas drawn from Montesquieu concerned with providing wisdom 
and stability in government. Madison used portions of both 
to forge ideological weapons designed to protect the 
republic. 
However, Madison also heartily embraced liberal 
doctrines, my topic in chapter three. With regard to the 
3 
concept of natural rights, there was never a more committed 
advocate of inalienable rights than he. In addition, his 
theory of interest was a more positive doctrine than current 
historians, who have studied Madison's theory of interest 
solely through The Federalist, recognize. Madison 
understood that advancement of the public good occurred only 
when lawmakers understood the varied interests of the 
nation. Despite historians' rhetoric to the contrary, in 
Madison's mind liberalism and republicanism were not 
antithetical. 
Nowhere is Madison's joining of liberal and republican 
ideas clearer than in his views on political economy. This 
part of his ideology, the best example of the way he wove 
together portions of both ideologies, is the focus of 
chapter four. Madison glorified the virtuous farmer as the 
bulwark of the republic. However, he also encouraged 
development of a robust, aggressive, commerce based on 
agricultural surplus. To his mind, agriculture maintained 
republican character, and exporting of surpluses provided 
individuals the opportunity to pursue their innate desire 
for self betterment. 
Interpretations of Madison's thought suffer, in short, 
because historians focus on single ideological paradigms 
and, in doing so, use sources narrowly. One ideology, 
either liberal or republican, and one source, specifically 
The Federalist, cannot adequately explain this thinker. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to historian Peter Onuf many scholars view 
the recent Constitutional bicentennial as an intellectual 
failure because it failed to produce new interpretations of 
the founding period. However, Onuf took issue with this 
conclusion on the grounds that critics did not understand 
how interpretations regarding this epoch were "being 
redefined." 1 To Onuf the recent debate over the 
intellectual heritage of the founding period had contributed 
to a greater understanding of the "complexities of American 
republican thought." 2 With regard to James Madison, one of 
the most enigmatic yet essential actors of this period, 
Onuf's observation deserves serious attention. 
Despite the longevity of his career and his prominent 
role in politics from the Revolution until his death in 
1836, Madison has not captured anywhere near the scholarly 
attention as have Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and 
Hamilton. Arguably, he contributed more in the long run to 
the American republic than any of the others. He served as 
1 Peter S. Onuf, "Reflections on the Founding: 
Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 46.2 (April 1989), 341-375, 341. 
2 Ibid., 342. 
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a political theoretician, a representative at both the 
national and local level, Secretary of State, and President. 
In retirement he remained active as a political "guru" of 
the republic. 
The very complexity of Madison's thought and the 
longevity of his career makes him difficult to pin down. 
Even today noted scholars back away from tackling his career 
and thought in full. 3 While acknowledging the richness and 
diversity of Madison's thought, little in the way of serious 
effort has been given to drawing out the complexity of his 
mind. Scholars have described Madison as acting from a 
singular motive or ideology. Two ideological 
interpretations, in particular, have dominated Madison 
studies. 
Currently, the debate over Madison's ideology centers 
on his ideas as exclusively ''republican" or "liberal." 
Scholars applying one paradigm or the other have depicted 
Madison as either a selfless patriot or scheming aristocrat. 
Historians such as J.G.A. Pocock, Caroline Robbins, Bernard 
Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Lance Banning, and Drew McCoy, who use 
the republican paradigm, have traced the development and 
transformation of its ideology from ancient Greece, to 
3 Two conspicuous examples are Robert Rutland, James 
Madison: The Founding Father (New York: McMillian, 1987), 
which focuses on Madison's life after the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, and Drew McCoy's recent, The Last of the 
Founding Fathers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), which deals above all with Madison's views on 
slavery, primarily after 1815. 
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sixteenth century Florentine, Italy, seventeenth century 
England, and finally to eighteenth century America. 4 
According to scholars who apply the republican paradigm, the 
Founding Fathers drew deeply on republican doctrine during 
the Revolution and the republic's formative years. Central 
to these scholars' delineation of republican doctrine is the 
concept of virtue. Virtue in a republican context referred 
to the public good, that is the ability of a republic's 
citizenry to put public needs above private desires. Virtue 
in this manner demanded a certain political and social order 
designed to insure a republic's survival. A political 
system which balanced power between an executive, 
legislative, and judicial branch was essential. Basically a 
static theory, classical republicanism defined the state as 
an organic entity. Republican doctrine held that change in 
the political structure was evil. Every alteration 
indicated an increase in age and pointed to a corruption of 
the society's fundamental principles, a sure sign of a 
republic's decay and inevitable destruction. 
According to the theory, a republic must remain small 
to guarantee that its citizens remained a homogenous body 
dedicated to public matters. Republican theory insisted, 
furthermore, on the necessity of its members economic 
independence. Equality among citizens was an important 
component of the social order. While equality did not refer 
4 For a list of relevant works see below, note twelve. 
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to an absolute, equal distribution of wealth, it did allude 
to a type of economic parity in which citizens avoided 
dependence on others for their livelihood. Usually an 
agrarian lifestyle gained prominence over others because in 
theory it allowed citizens to provide for themselves without 
relying on others. This independence allowed the body 
.Politic to remain pure, and thwart those who might use 
economic coercion to advance their self interest at the 
expense of the public. By the same token, self interest was 
viewed as evil. It corrupted the republic's collective 
character, and threatened its stability by introducing 
values that destroyed the public, homogenous nature which 
held the community together. Republican ideology denied the 
individual, and instructed citizens to devote themselves to 
public service. 
In contrast to historians who stress classical 
republican tenets as the basis for the founding era, those 
historians who emphasize the discourse of liberalism--Louis 
Hartz, Joyce Appleby, John Patrick Diggins, and Issac 
Kramnick, in particular--maintain an ideology of 
individualism comprised the principles upon which American 
politics was based. 5 Drawn from the works of John Locke 
and Adam Smith, liberalism held that the best society is one 
that allows the individual to advance his self interest. 
5 Important liberal sources are cited in notes 
fourteen, fifteen and sixteen. 
Government's role was small, and consisted mainly of 
governing only enough to insure that all had a fair 
opportunity to develop their economic potential. 
Liberalism, then, encouraged individual self interest. 
5 
Equality of opportunity was the watchword of its adherents. 
Whereas republican doctrine demanded that citizens share the 
quality of civic virtue, liberal doctrine emphasized the 
right--the so-called natural right--of individuals to choose 
their own religious, economic and political values. From 
the liberal perspective progress took on a more positive 
light. Rather than an indication of decay, it signified a 
positive step. Change was a natural characteristic of an 
aggressive, individualistic people putting their abilities 
to work. Historians of the liberal persuasion see the 
values of self interest, competition, and economic 
development beyond the countryside providing a national 
ideological consensus. 
The idea of self interest, then, undergirds the liberal 
interpretation of the founding epoch, just as the concept of 
virtue bolsters the republican. Understood in such a 
manner, these definitions provide the pivot upon which this 
thesis turns. Those who have written about Madison have 
tended to make him into either a republican or liberal. 
Madison scholarship seems like a tug of war, with Madison 
caught in the middle. Each side has attempted to pull his 
character to one side and explain his actions through a one 
6 
dimensional interpretative framework. 
While this thesis surveys Madison's political theory in 
light of considerations raised by recent scholarship on the 
republican and liberal tradition, it is important to note 
that published studies of this founder throughout the 
twentieth century have been marked by narrow, one 
dimensional portraits. Progressive historians, reacting in 
the early twentieth century against what they considered as 
uncritical, reverential nineteenth century interpretations 
of the founding period, followed the lead of J. Allen Smith. 
Smith's The Spirit of American Government was the opening 
salvo in the Progressive attack on the men at the 
Constitutional Convention, one of whom was James Madison. 6 
Along similar lines, Charles Beard's Economic Interpretation 
of the Constitution became the lightning rod for a 
generation of constitutional scholars. Like Smith, Beard 
held that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention had 
protection of their interests and property in mind as they 
formed the new government. Economic motives, he argued, not 
political ideology, provided the impetus for political 
reform. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
Beard's "economic determinism" drew on Madison's "Tenth 
Federalist" for support, insuring the character of Madison 
6 James Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government 
(New York: MacMillian, 1907.) See Richard Hofstadter's, The 
Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), for an overview of the 
Progressive historians. 
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would figure prominently in future debates over the 
Constitution. 
Beard's work reopened interest in the Constitutional 
era and promoted--in particular through the controversy over 
economic determinism--new interpretations of Madison. One 
offspring of Beard was the pluralist view. With regards to 
interpretations of Madison, the pluralist perspective 
contains two different views, one negative and the other 
positive. In general both pluralist views hold that Madison 
recognized the diverse interests of American society, and 
actively incorporated them into the new Constitutional 
system. Pluralists differ, however, in regard to Madison's 
reasons for encouraging multiple interests to influence the 
new government. Positive pluralists maintain Madison wanted 
interest groups to participate directly in government and 
have a voice in the formation of policy. Negative 
pluralists argue that Madison formed a government in which 
different interests negated each other by design, allowing 
the colonial elite to govern with little interference. 
From the turn of the century to the end of World War 
II, the works of Harold Laski, Harold Bentley, and Walter 
Lippman provide the best example of the former view, the 
positive pluralist interpretation. 7 As Paul Bourke has 
7 See Harold Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty (New 
York: Books for Libraries Press, 1921, 1968); Walter 
Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1922, 1949); 
and Arthur Bentley, Process of Government (Evanston, IL: the 
Principia Press of Illinois 1908, 1935). 
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shown, this affirmative perception contrasted with Beardian 
interpretations in that they praised the founders for 
advancing their self interest. Commonly referred to as 
"interest group theorists, those who have pressed the 
"positive pluralist view" described Madison's "Tenth 
Federalist'' as exhibiting an "essentially modern grasp of 
the group character of politics and of the play of organized 
groups on political institutions. 118 In this view Madison 
was an ally of those looking to decentralize the authority 
of the political state, and distribute it among various 
interest groups. 
In contrast, the negative pluralist view of Madison 
advanced a Beardian line. It regained prominence after 
World War II. Its foremost adherents were scholars such as 
James McGregor Burns, Robert Dahl, and Frank M. Coleman. 
They depicted the Constitution as an elitist document and 
maintained that Madison and his cohorts designed it to 
thwart majority rule through a scheme of checks and 
balances. 9 Government under the new Constitution--as 
devised by Madison--sought to frustrate the will of the 
majority. 
8 Paul F. Bourke, "The Pluralist Reading of James 
Madison's Tenth Federalist," Perspectives in American 
History, 9 (1975), 271-295, 273. 
9 Consult Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic 
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); James 
McGregor Burns, Deadlock of Democracy (New York: McGraw Hill 
Book Co., 1971); and Frank M. Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis 
of American Constitutionalism," Polity, 7.1 (1974), 57-89. 
9 
Since World War II both pluralist visions of Madison 
and the founding era have drawn fire from scholars who 
downplay the role of interest in eighteenth century politics 
and emphasize, instead, ideological factors. The fifties--
still the most noteworthy decade in terms of Madison 
scholarship--saw the brilliant work of Adrienne Koch, Irving 
Brant, Neal Riemer, Martin Diamond, and Douglas Adair. 
Adair, in a series of articles and an unpublished but often 
cited dissertation, argued that the ideology of the Scottish 
Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume, provided Madison with 
his ideas of faction and the extended republic. 10 Brant, 
in his multi-volume biography of Madison, along with other 
works by Koch, Riemer, and Diamond, stressed Madison's 
commitment to representative government, implicitly drawing 
out the Lockean influences in his thought. 11 From their 
works Madison emerged as more democratic, and the importance 
10 Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 8.1 (January 1951), 467-487; and 
"That Politics May Be Reduced to Science: David Hume, James 
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," Huntington Library 
Quarterly, 20.4 (August 1957), 343-360. These two articles 
are good summaries of Adair's theories concerning Madison's 
ideological influences. 
11 Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1941-61.); Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and 
Madison: The Great Collaboration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1950); Neal Riemer, "The Republicanism of James Madison," 
Political Science Quarterly, 69 (March 1954), 45-64; and 
"James Madison's Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of 
Republican Government," Ethics 65 (October 1954), 34-43; and 
Martin Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist: A 
Reconsideration of the Framer's Intent," American Political 
Science Review, 53 (March 1959), 52-68. 
10 
of political ideology to his thought appeared paramount. 
During the late sixties and early seventies, however, 
yet another paradigm of the founders' thought appeared, and 
interpretations of Madison underwent another revision. The 
classical republican revolution among American historians 
discarded economic and Lockean interpretations of the 
founding era, and instead argued for the primacy of English 
Opposition thought as the fuel which ignited the 
revolutionary fires of the eighteenth century. J.G.A. 
Pocock and Caroline Robbins traced the ancient, European, 
and English development of classical republican thought (or 
civic humanism) to America. Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood 
analyzed the transformation and manifestation of Opposition 
thought in its American setting before and during the 
Revolutionary and founding periods. 12 
12 The literature produced by classical historians is 
voluminous. Some of the more important works are J.G.A. 
Pocock The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975; Caroline Robbins The 
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealth Man: Studies in the 
Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English 
Liberal Thought From the Restoration Charles II until the 
War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959); Bernard Bailyn The Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood The Creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1969); Lance Banning The Jeffersonian 
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive 
Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). Robert 
Shalhope has provided two historiographical analyses of 
republicanism in "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The 
Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American 
11 
Following the lead of Robbins, Pocock, Bailyn and Wood, 
other scholars who use the republican model interpreted 
Madison in new ways. Lance Banning, in The Jeffersonian 
Persuasion, depicted Madison as a quintessential classical 
republican. He saw the Jeffersonians as reacting to 
Federalist modernizing policies in much the same manner as 
had Radical Whigs in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
England. Just as the Whigs, the so-called "Country" bloc, 
stubbornly resisted the English "Court" party's seventeenth 
century attempt to usher in a new, commercial society based 
on financial manipulation, so, according to Banning, did the 
Jeffersonians resent the development-minded policies of 
Alexander Hamilton. In each instance, English and American 
"country thinkers'' saw their adversaries as innately 
corrupt. 
Drew McCoy sketched an even clearer picture of Madison 
as a classical republican in the Elusive Republic. Studying 
Madison's political ideology, McCoy depicted Madison's 
support for an agrarian society as an attempt to expand 
across time rather than space. According to McCoy, Madison 
favored geographic expansion to slow America's progression 
toward a manufacturing society, anathema to classical 
republicans who viewed modernity as innately corrupt. To 
Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 29.1 (January 
1972), 49-80, and "Republicanism and Early American 
Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 39.2 (April 
1982), 334-356. 
12 
both Banning and McCoy, Madison was always looking backwards 
to find the true republican society. He fought to forestall 
the future. 13 He feared change because it threatened to 
destroy the economic and political principles upon which the 
republic's security rested. 
Like the Lockean and economic interpretations of the 
founding era, republican explanations stressed the dominance 
of one ideology. From 1968 to 1980 this view of eighteenth 
century American society--and of Madison--reigned supreme. 
Convincing challenges to this monolithic view appeared 
slowly and has left the historiography of Madison and the 
founding period in a state of flux. 
Joyce Appleby first attacked the classical view of the 
founding period. Appleby refocused scholarly attention on a 
different set of principles: the liberal, Lockean, and Adam 
Smithian. She finds in these the heart of Jeffersonian 
ideology. Appleby undermined much of classical 
historiography by showing liberal ideas competed openly with 
Radical Whig paradigms in both seventeenth century England 
and late eighteenth century America. 14 Yet unlike older 
pluralist interpretations, which used the concept of self 
interest to describe either a political attempt by a 
13 See note 9 for bibliographical information on 
McCoy's and Banning's monographs. 
14 Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in 
Seventeenth Century England (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978); and Capitalism and the New Social Order (New 
York: New York University Press, 1984). 
13 
colonial elite to thwart majority rule, or depicted the 
founders as advocating a modern concept of interest group 
politics, Appleby presented a broader and more egalitarian 
picture of liberalism. Echoing, and pushing beyond, Louis 
Hartz's Liberal Tradition in America she maintained that 
individualistic Lockean doctrines permeated the political, 
economic, and social structure of America in the 1790s. 
Jeffersonian liberalism, in Appleby's view, encouraged a 
democratic, informal type of politics open to all, not just 
a colonial elite. Jeffersonians, she continued, espoused a 
doctrine of rough equality, which in turn threatened a 
dominant colonial upper class, represented by the 
Federalists. Far from being a source of republican distrust 
and fear, Appleby showed that ideas of self interest, 
commerce, and prosperity swayed men of this time as much as 
republican ideas of virtue, frugality and self sufficiency. 
Appleby's Madison, therefore, appeared decidedly more 
modern, economically and politically, than did the Madison 
of McCoy or Banning. 
Others have sided with Appleby. Isaac Kramnick has 
noted that eighteenth century republican ideology was not 
without competitors. He maintained that at least four 
different paradigms competed for supremacy during the 
formative years of the republic. Republican, liberal, work 
ethic Protestantism, and state centered theories of power 
and sovereignty proliferated and citizens easily interwove 
14 
strands of each into their discourse. 15 
John Patrick Diggins, on the other hand, has classified 
the hunt for classical republican thought in eighteenth 
century America as a snipe hunt. 16 According to Diggins, 
republican historians have mistaken Calvinistic doctrines 
for civic humanism because both stressed concern with the 
.Public good. For Diggins, the foundations of American 
society rested on Lockean and Calvinist principles. He held 
that republican scholars viewed the founding period as 
ideologically alienated from the present. A change of 
principles had transpired. They surmised, wrongly according 
to Diggins, that liberalism had, at some time, replaced 
republican principles as the guiding precepts of American 
society. He maintained that America seemed divorced from 
its original maxims because the crucial corrective to 
unfettered Lockean liberalism, Calvinism, had vanished from 
the American mind. 
While Diggins deplored modern liberalism, he argued 
that its roots spring from a moral liberal tradition active 
in the Republic's early years. While Diggins stressed the 
dominance of liberal doctrines in American History, he 
interpreted Madison in a different manner. For all of his 
15 Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion': 
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 45.1 (January 1988), 3-32. 
16 John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American 
Politics: Virtue, Self Interest, and the Foundations of 
Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1985). 
15 
insistence on the presence of Calvinism during the 
Constitutional era, he imparted little of it to Madison's 
character. Following the older pluralist tradition in this 
instance, Diggins characterized Madison as anti-democratic, 
determined to use government to manipulate diverse 
interests, protect the wealthy, and frustrate the will of 
the majority. Diggins, in this instance, fell into a neo-
Beardian mindset, and thus explained Madison's motivation 
during the founding era as a plot to entrench the colonial 
aristocracy. Protection of economic power was his 
preeminent, if not only, goal. In this regard Diggins added 
the weight of his scholarship to an explanatory model of 
Madison which was already anchored in a mire of narrow 
interpretations. 
With the notable exceptions of Kramnick and Appleby, 
twentieth century scholars described Madison through a 
singular paradigm, liberal or classical. Both arguments are 
valid in so far as they delineate aspects of Madison's 
ideology. Both err, however, in assuming the singularity of 
his mind. 
As of yet no historian of the founding era has sought 
to understand the classical side of Madison while also 
taking into account the recent demonstration of competing 
ideological voices in eighteenth century America. This 
thesis argues that a fuller understanding of Madison is 
possible only by approaching his thought as sui generis and 
16 
composed of an intermixture of both republican and liberal 
doctrines. 
Here I analyze Madison from the Revolution to 1795. The 
dates correspond roughly to the time covered by the most 
recent edition of Madison's writings. 17 Two important 
methodological premises deserve mention. First, in order to 
investigate the common assumption that Madison altered his 
ideology after 1788, his works before and after the 
Constitutional Convention demanded equal attention. 18 
Second, the research concentrated on Madison's private 
writings as much as his public ones. The greatest 
shortcoming of Madisonian scholarship is its reliance on The 
Federalist. A series of articles written during a partisan 
political struggle and under exacting time constraints, I 
hold, should not be made into the sole "authoritative" 
Madison text. For years scholars have interpreted Madison 
through his actions in 1787 and 1788. To the contrary, a 
17 The completion of Madison's papers, previously under 
the editorship of Robert Rutland and presently J.C.A. Stagg, 
is underway. 
18 A good example of this is exhibited by a recent 
exchange between two White House lawyers and Theodore Draper 
over the nature of executive power. In the article, the two 
legal counselors argue that Madison's true political beliefs 
were articulated at the Constitutional Convention and in the 
text of The Federalist. According to the two lawyers, 
Madison's later writings resulted from "purely political 
motives" dictated by his emergence as a Jeffersonian 
oppositional leader opposed to Federalist policies. His 
later writings, they hold, carry little validity when 
dealing with issues concerning the Constitution. Consult, 
"The Constitution in Danger," New York Review of Books, 37.8 
(17 May 1990), 50-53. 
17 
balanced account of Madison must grant as much authority to 
his private correspondence. While The Federalist is not 
excluded, it received less emphasis than tradition has 
previously demanded. 
Three chapters comprise the heart of this thesis. Each 
explores a different side of Madison's thought. Chapter two 
examines the "classical" Madison through two different 
strains of republicanism prominent in his thought, the 
Radical Whig tradition and the writings of Montesquieu. 
Radical Whig and Montesquieuian republicanism are alike in 
some ways, and different in others. Both believed in the 
concept of virtue, and the need for a homogenous, stable 
population as essential to a republic. Yet, Radical Whig 
theory was concerned more with corruption and abuse of 
power. It had a more defined political program. Its 
adherents in the United States took on a character that 
rejected the balance of power theory and advocated 
legislative supremacy. Representatives were to be mirrors 
of the population they served, and hold office for short 
terms to avoid corruption and increase accountability. 
In contrast, Montesquieu's republicanism is more theoretical 
than pragmatic, and while concerned with abuse of power, did 
not exhibit the paranoid fear of power prominent among 
English Opposition thinkers such as Algernon Sidney, John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Montesquieu wrote of the 
general characteristics of republics and examined standard 
18 
doctrines such as the balance of power. He was concerned as 
much, if not more, with the stability of the republic as 
with protecting it from pernicious forces. 
Madison employed the philosophy of both republican 
views as ideological weapons to protect the new American 
republic. The first part of the chapter, on Madison and 
Radical Whiggery, reveals the paranoid Madison, one 
concerned continually with insidious political and religious 
plots designed to enslave Americans. The second half of the 
chapter probes Madison's conception of the Senate, to him 
the crucial vessel of virtue. He believed a properly 
constructed Senate represented the establishment of virtue 
within government. If Radical Whig ideology protected 
society from detrimental internal and external threats, the 
Senate protected the stability of the new nation by acting 
with Montesquian coolness and reason. In Madison's mind, it 
was always attuned to the public good. 
Chapter three turns to the ''liberal" Madison. In it I 
seek to blunt the pluralist criticism of Madison. 
Pluralists who write in a Beardian vein have referred to 
Madison's doctrine of minority rights as proof of his 
complicity in plots to frustrate majority rule. His ardent 
support of property, they have held, also indicates his 
elitist tendencies. Yet, considered through his actions and 
other writings--that is his life outside The Federalist--it 
seems clear that Madison held to a theory of property that 
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was Lockean. Furthermore, Madison's well developed 
philosophy of minority rights displays a logical application 
of natural law to civil society. To Madison's mind, 
majority rule must reign supreme, but could never infringe 
natural rights. Subsequently, the individual and socially 
marginal groups--not the social elite of the colonies--found 
a champion in Madison. 
The second half of the chapter revises conventional 
interpretations of Madison's theory of interest. Looking 
beyond The Federalist Papers reveals the lopsided view most 
scholars have taken towards Madison's doctrine of interest. 
Described in The Federalist Papers as a negative force, 
other evidence exists to show that for Madison interest 
advanced properly was not evil, but an important part of the 
process of discerning the public good. 
Chapter four explores, through an analyses of Madison's 
political economy, what Isaac Kramnick referred to as "the 
profusion and confusion of political tongues among the 
founders. " 19 Madison's thought in this regard manifests a 
blending of classical and liberal tenets. While an advocate 
of free trade and the releasing of individual initiative, 
Madison also held to republican ideas which upheld the moral 
and political benefits of an agrarian society. No better 
example of the sui generis nature of Madison's thought 
19 Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion': 
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 4. 
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exists than his political economy. 
Explaining Madison through the lens of one ideology 
does injustice to one of the most profound American 
thinkers. Madison himself once noted "there is a middle way 
to be taken which corresponds at once with the theory of 
free government and the lessons of experience. 1120 Scholars 
of Madison should heed his words. To adherents of the 
liberal and classical paradigms, Madison acted either solely 
out of self interest, or conducted himself in a selfless 
manner and expected the rest of society to adjust 
accordingly. The middle way is missing in most of their 
works, and it is time to describe Madison in the same terms 
that he used, three years before his death, to characterize 
the American system of government, "emphatically sui 
generis. 1121 
20 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973), Madison to John 
Brown, 12 October 1788, 58. 
21 Madison to Daniel Webster, 15 March 1833, quoted in 
Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 149. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CLASSICAL MADISON: TYRANNY AND VIRTUE 
In a recent biography, Drew McCoy stressed the 
importance of republican ideology to Madison's thought, 
especially his ability to act in a cool, objective manner. 
Following McCoy's lead, this chapter explores the influence 
of classical republicanism on Madison's thought. While not 
arguing for an interpretation of Madison as solely 
classical, this chapter shows aspects of Madison's thought 
depended upon tenets of civic humanism. In particular, 
Madison's struggle for freedom of conscience has long been 
used to reveal the influence of Lockean principles. 
However, Madison's concern for religious freedom reveals 
more than a concern for civil rights. It also shows the 
influence of radical Whig ideology. Madison's fear of a 
political and religious conspiracy showed his persistent, 
and very republican, concern that a corrupted government 
could subvert liberty and lead to tyranny. 
Furthermore, Madison's view of the Senate coincided 
with classical descriptions of an upper-house. His 
description of the functions of the Senate was similar to 
Montesquieu. The upper-house would use virtue to check 
faction. A virtuous Senate combined with a citizenry imbued 
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with republican values were key ingredients to keeping 
America stable and free. When Madison used republican 
language it habitually concerned protection of the republic. 
Historians now realize that Americans used the ideology 
of Radical Whiggery to grasp the significance of the acts 
initiated by the British Parliament following 1763. These 
acts were not seen as prudent, moderate attempts to 
stabilize British finances. Colonists, rather, molded Whig 
ideology to their own circumstances, and viewed each act as 
a deliberate precedent setting measure of a corrupt and 
devious British monarchy intent on reducing the colonists to 
a state of dependence. Tyranny would replace liberty unless 
the colonists halted the process before their bonds rendered 
them unable to resist. 
According to revolutionary thinkers who drew upon Whig 
doctrines, a key conspirator in this plot to enslave the 
colonist was the Anglican church. Before 1763, suspicions 
of the church were widespread. Talk of establishing an 
episcopate in the colonies caused people to fear the church. 
Especially troublesome was the creation in 1701 of the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, a branch of the 
Anglican church formed to evangelize native Americans. Many 
colonists believed its true aim consisted of a "formal 
design to root out Presbyterianism, etc., and to 
23 
establishing both episcopacy and bishops."1 The events 
that transpired after 1763 convinced many colonists that the 
Anglican church threatened not only religious freedom, but 
was part of a larger British attempt to deprive Americans of 
their liberty. By 1765, many colonists assumed "the 
stamping of and episcopizing [of] our colonies were ... only 
different branches of the same plan of power." 2 One of 
those men affected by this idea of a dual religious-
political conspiracy to subjugate Americans was James 
Madison. To paraphrase the remarks of J.G.A. Pocock, 
Madison, in opposing Anglican establishment, spoke the 
language of the country party (Radical Whiggery) and knew he 
spoke it. 3 
Madison's first public act showing his concern over 
British activities occurred during his days at the College 
of New Jersey (Princeton) . He was an early and always 
prominent member of the American Whig society. In reality 
the club devoted most of its time to satiric (and sometimes 
obscene poems) aimed at the more piously minded Clios, 
1 Jonathan Mayhew, "Observations on the Charter and 
Conduct of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 
Foreign Parts," (Boston, 1763): 103-108. Quoted in Bernard 
Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 96. 
2 Alden Bradford, Memoir of the Life and Writings of 
Rev. Jonathan Mayhew (Boston, 1838), 372. Quoted in Ibid, 
97. 
3 J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 529. Pocock's 
actual words are "The Jeffersonians spoke the language of 
the country and knew they spoke it." 
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called Tories by Madison and friends because it proved the 
worst insult possible. While the club spent most of its 
time in social activities, the political connotations are 
evident from the names. The name "American Whig" referred 
in 1768 to the pen name of William Livingston, a man who had 
vigorously opposed an attempt by the Anglican church to 
strengthen church-state ties by creating an American 
episcopate. Members of the American Whig Society joined the 
club because they felt it offered a means to counter British 
attempts to establish a new set of royal church governors in 
the colonies. 4 
Madison, in joining the Whig club, revealed his 
opposition to the continued creation of offices in America 
for placemen, which he saw continuing the process of 
corruption. Customs enforcement offices created by the 
Townshend duties of 1770, and the attempt to create more 
posts for clergymen, revealed the insidious plot by the 
crown to continue to take further political power from the 
assemblies, and religious freedom from all. 
Madison's concern over a dual political and religious 
threat to liberty was fully apparent in a candid letter to 
his college alumnus, William Bradford, in 1774. Commenting 
on the Boston Tea Party, Madison declared that while 
4 Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:84-86. Brant reveals 
that Livingston's fight over church state separation began 
in 1752 when he published the "Independent Reflector," in 
which he opposed using public funds to support a parochial 
school. 
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Bostonians might have used more discretion, they had 
accomplished one important goal. Political and even 
military contests were needed to "instruct in the Art of 
defending Liberty and property." Madison felt the British 
assaults on the colonies, especially Boston, had a positive 
side in so far as the attacks stopped any notion of Anglican 
establishment in the northern colonies, an institution 
Madison himself suffered under in Virginia. Madison claimed 
that if the Anglicans had succeeded, "slavery and Subjection 
would have been gradually insinuated among us." The problem 
resulted because established churches "tend to great 
ignorance and Corruption, all of which facilitate the 
Execution of mischievous Projects." 5 
Madison here reiterated a common revolutionary Whig 
theme. An established church becomes dangerous because it 
can be manipulated by individuals bent on tyranny. The King 
and his ministers were usually identified as instigators of 
this plot. Not surprisingly, Madison condemned in this same 
letter the "ministerialism'' of Massachusetts Governor 
Hutchinson, whose patronage machine provided an obvious 
example to American Whigs of anti-republican corruption. 
Madison's fear of the Anglican church caused him to act 
in ways uncharacteristic of the future champion of civil and 
5 William T. Hutchinson and Robert A. Rutland, et.al., 
The Papers of James Madison, 15 vols. (Charlottesville, Va: 
University of Virginia Press, and Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962-1985), Madison to William Bradford, 24 
January 1774, 1:105. Hereafter cited as JM. 
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religious rights. In June of 1775 the Continental Congress 
designated July 20 as a day of public fasting and prayer in 
order to bring King George to a "reasonable" state of mind. 
An Anglican parish priest, Madison informed a friend, 
refused to "observe the fast or preach on that day" pleading 
freedom of conscience. As a member of the Orange County 
Committee of Safety, Madison participated in closing the 
church and stopping the minister's salary stopped. Indeed, 
if the man did not stop his insolence Madison warned that he 
might get "ducked in a coat of tar and surplus of feathers 
and then he may go ... and act under the lawful authority of 
Genl. Gage." 6 Three months earlier the committee had 
visited the rector of the church the Madisons attended. 
Reverend John Wingate apparently had possession of several 
pamphlets which condemned the actions of the Continental 
Congress. When the pastor refused to turn over the 
requested pamphlets, the group took the pamphlets, most 
likely by force, and burned them because they contained "the 
most imprudent falsehoods and malicious artifices ... " 
designed to "excite divisions among the friends of 
America." 7 As for the author of the pamphlets, a New York 
Loyalist by the name of Rivington, Madison declared his wish 
6 JM, Madison to William Bradford, 28 July 1775, 1:161. 
7 Irving Brant, James Madison. 1:162-63. The quote is 
from a declaration the Orange Committee of Safety issued 
before burning the pamphlets. Brant has "good reason to 
believe" Madison was the author. 
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to have "Rivington and his ministerial gazetteers for 24 
hours in this place. Execrable as their designs are, they 
would meet with adequate punishment," most likely tar and 
feathers, a favorite punishment of Madison at this time. 8 
Madison's intolerance of the Anglican clergy 
underscored his fear that the Church remained a threat to 
American liberty. The work of corrupt men like Rivington 
and "his ministerial gazetteers" fostered disunion and 
hampered the colonists' attempt to stave off corruption. 
Madison would not concede the Anglicans' argument for 
"freedom of opinion," denouncing it as rhetoric used in the 
plot against liberty. What is unique about Madison's 
attitude and actions was the fact it aimed only at 
Anglicans, who in the colonies embodied "the wickedness of 
the present Ministry." 9 In contrast, he tolerated other 
religious sects who did not abide by the rules of the 
Continental Congress because they were not part of the plot 
to enslave the colonists. 
In January of 1775 Madison contemplated the decision of 
Quakers not to sign the Continental Association. In a 
8 Ibid., Madison to William Bradford, Early March 
1775, 1:141. Madison's disposition to tar and feathers is 
quite evident in this letter. He contrasted the spirit of 
Virginians, who recently tarred and feathered a man who 
treated one of the members of the Committee with disrespect, 
with that of New York where Rivington and company operated 
with impunity. 
9 JM, Madison to William Bradford, 20 January 1775, 
1:135. 
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letter to William Bradford, the young Virginian remarked he 
could not "forbear suspecting them to be under the controul 
and direction" of the British, "for I take those of them 
that we have to be too honest and simple to have any 
sinister or secret Views .... " While Madison did not think 
anything in the Association "inconsistent with their 
religious princ[i]ples," he respected their view. 10 To 
him, the difference between the Quakers and Anglicans was 
that Quaker religious precepts were genuine, while the 
Anglicans used theirs to advance a "deliberate systematic 
plan of reducing us to slavery." 11 Thus Madison was 
willing to grant Quakers the freedom of their convictions, 
despite his disagreement with them, while he denied the same 
rights to Anglicans, who, in his opinion, would use their 
freedom to subvert rather than nurture liberty. 
Other aspects of Madison's thought during this time 
also testify to the influence of Whig ideology, particularly 
the doctrine of precedence. Whig political theory stressed 
the deference of the people to their rulers. It stressed 
social stability, but by implying the people were normally 
docile Whigs implied that they would revolt only when a true 
threat existed. To Madison, as to other Whig minded 
revolutionaries, the idea of precedence was all important, 
10 Ibid., 135. 
11 Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View," quoted in Gordon 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 39. 
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for if an act of the government caused strife among the 
people one could be sure a conspiracy against liberty 
existed. In turn, once sinister forces bent on enslavement 
of the citizenry became known, the people should "thus 
resist the forces of tyranny before they were actually 
enslaved." 12 Whigs, therefore, scrupulously examined acts 
of government to see if any dangerous precedents existed, 
and then acted to extinguish the threat before it unfolded. 
The idea of opposing tyranny at its inception was 
evident in Madison the revolutionary. Madison chided his 
friend William Bradford in 1774 for the instructions given 
by the Pennsylvania Assembly to its delegates to the 
Continental Congress. Pennsylvania advised the delegates to 
avoid all preparations for conflict and instead wait for the 
Crown to come to its senses and repeal its "obnoxious" 
legislation. The Pennsylvanians, according to Madison, 
counted too heavily on the "generosity & Justice of the 
Crown" to act in a way favorable to the colonies. Madison 
thought it prudent to begin defense preparations and let 
Parliament's reaction to the Congressional petitions decide 
whether to cease or continue. Delay on the colonies' part 
"emboldens our adversaries," he insisted, cooled the united 
passions of Americans against the British, and improved the 
schemes of "our ... secret enemies to disseminate discord & 
12 Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 
37-39. 
30 
disunion. " 13 Madison, then, would not wait for the reply 
of the King. Only early preparation for conflict, not the 
King's good will, preserved liberty. Resting on one's 
laurels allowed the agents of tyranny time to hamstring 
liberty's defenders. 
If Madison in this instance showed his concern with 
.early organization to counter a conspiracy against liberty, 
he developed it and the idea of precedent to a fuller extent 
after the Revolution in his fight against religious 
establishment in Virginia. By 1785 Madison had served in 
the Virginia Council of State, the Virginia Constitutional 
Convention of 1776, the Virginia House of Delegates, and the 
Continental Congress. He was a seasoned politician, as he 
displayed in the 1784 session of the Virginia legislature. 
Before it came a measure to re-establish the Episcopal 
church. At the beginning of the session it appeared the 
bill would pass. Supporters of the measure also had a 
powerful figure, Patrick Henry, on their side. But by 
stalling Madison postponed a vote on establishment until the 
next session. He also artfully eliminated the threat of 
Henry. Madison appealed to his ambition and worked to elect 
him governor, eliminating the most important ally of 
13 JM, Madison to William Bradford, 23 August 1774, 
1:121. 
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establishment. 14 
By holding the bill over until the next session Madison 
believed opposition to establishment would appear. Many 
Virginians confirmed his opinion by removing many of its 
supporters in the 1785 elections. Even so two of his 
allies, George and Wilson Nicholaus, felt that more needed 
to be done to destroy the bill. The Nicholaus' urged 
Madison to write an appeal to the public, and he agreed. 
The result was his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance." 15 
Madison's work in this regard has long been hailed as 
evidence of his devotion to Lockean, natural, rights. What 
has been neglected is the extent to which Madison's essay 
also reflected classical sentiments. Madison's fear of 
tyranny, the machinations of a dual religious-political 
conspiracy, his concern for precedence, and the language he 
employed all displayed the influence of classical 
republicanism. 
In the first section of the essay, Madison gave a 
concise and--and clearly Lockean--plea for the inalienable 
14 Irving Brant, "Madison: On the Separation of Church 
and State," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 8.1 
(January 1951), 4-5. 
15 The editors of the Madison Papers maintain that the 
impact of "Memorial and Remonstrance" on assessment was 
minimal. Less than one fifth of all Virginians who were 
recorded as protesting establishment signed Madison's 
treatise. 1,552 signed their approval of "Memorial and 
Remonstrance" while another tract opposed to the bill, 
''Teacher's of Christian Religion," garnered 4899 signatures. 
The greater significance of Madison's work lies in the 
extent to which it revealed his own philosophy. 
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right of freedom of conscience. But, in addition, and most 
important in this regard, the second section of the essay 
developed the republican themes of corruption and tyranny 
inherent in the bill. With regards to the latter, Madison 
noted that the preservation of a free government required 
more than fidelity to the classical separation of 
governmental departments. Citizens devoted to republican 
rule must also prevent any branch of government from 
committing an even greater type of corruption. They must 
scrutinize the government's acts to insure that political 
power never destroyed "the great barrier which defends the 
rights of the people." 16 Classical theory taught that 
corruption occurred whenever a branch of the government 
assumed responsibilities not delegated to it. As 
Montesquieu pointed out in The Spirit of the Laws, once a 
republic is corrupted the community could not remedy any 
evils except "by removing the corruption and restoring lost 
principles. " 17 In typical Whig fashion, Madison grimly 
described the outcome if the "great barrier" was not re-
erected and government officials stopped from violating 
their "metes and bounds." Rulers guilty of such 
encroachments, he warned, threatened to become "Tyrants." 
16 JM, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785, 
8:299. 
17 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. 
Franz Neumann, trans. Thomas Nugent 2 vols. (New York: 
Hafner Publishing, 1966), 1:8:12:117. This citation method 
refers to volume, book, section, and page number. 
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"The people who submit to it ... are slaves. " 18 
The fear of tyranny, so pervasive in Whig pamphlets 
prior to the revolution, remained with Madison long after 
the struggle for independence. 19 As Irving Brant has 
pointed out, the language used by Madison in "Memorial and 
Remonstrance" regarding tyranny and slavery did not consist 
of a figurative use of the symbols of force; rather these 
terms pointed back to the threat of British tyranny, which 
the colonists had thwarted only after a long and arduous 
struggle. 20 Madison implored his readers to destroy 
establishment before chaos again engulfed the colonies. 
Always aware of his audience, Madison illuminated the 
consequences of tyranny in a form no Virginian could fail to 
miss. While they recognized the political "slavery" 
described by Whig ideology, Virginians experienced it 
intimately every day through the institution of chattel 
slavery. They knew better than anyone in the North the 
depths such bondage entailed. 
In section eight of "Memorial and Remonstrance" Madison 
returned to, and underscored powerfully, his republican fear 
of tyranny. There he analyzed the influence ecclesiastical 
18 JM, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785, 
8:299-300. 
19 For an examination of the Revolutionary pamphlets 
see Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 4 
vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) 
20 Irving Brant, "Madison: On the Separation of Church 
& State," 10. 
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establishments had on civil society and warned that as often 
as not they erected a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of 
civil authority. In most instances establishment upheld 
"the thrones of political authority." Rulers who wished to 
subvert public liberty "have found an established clergy 
convenient auxiliaries. " 21 Establishment, then, had no 
merit whatsoever. It pointed to spiritual tyranny and 
political domination. In this case Madison referred his 
readers to history, and, most importantly to their 
Revolutionary memory of the Anglican Church taking part in 
the British scheme to enslave them. 
The precedent of the bill for religious establishment 
also drew Madison's attention. In a letter to Jefferson in 
January of 1785, he confided that establishment proved 
obnoxious because of "its dishonorable principle and 
dangerous tendency." 22 The tendency or precedent of the 
bill called for quick action before the consequences could 
be felt. Whig ideology provided an ideological influence 
which led Madison to recognize and resist tyranny at its 
inception, and, in turn, he called on American citizens to 
do the same. 
Section three of "Memorial and Remonstrance" focused on 
the need for early action against schemes of usurpation. In 
21 JM, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785, 
8:302. 
22 Ibid., Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 9 January 1785, 
8:229. 
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it Madison declared that "it is proper to take alarm at the 
first experiment on our liberties." In addition, he 
insisted that "we hold this prudent jealously to be the 
first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest 
characteristics of the late Revolution." The American 
revolutionaries "did not wait until usurped power had 
strengthened itself ... and entangled the question in 
precedents." "We revere this lesson much too much to forget 
it. " 23 Madison again referred his readers back to the 
Revolution, reminding them that successful struggles against 
tyranny resulted from those who anticipated the problem and 
eliminated it before precedents gave it the semblance of 
legality and tradition. 
This, as Madison put it, "jealousy" of liberty was, to 
him, both a duty and a right fought for in the Revolution, 
one stamped deeply in the memory of every American. The 
lessons of the Revolution--here seen through the lens of 
English Opposition ideology--provided the key to resisting 
establishment. 
With all of the above, however, Madison was not done 
drawing parallels between the Revolution and the present. 
In an offhand but recognizable reference, he underscored his 
point that the establishment of one sect could also lead to 
religious and political domination. The same authority 
23 Ibid., "Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785, 
8:300. 
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"which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of 
his property for the establishment of one religion," Madison 
wrote, "may force him to conform to any other establishment 
in all cases whatsoever. 1124 The importance of this phrase 
rests with the monetary sum Madison used. All those that 
had fought in the Revolution knew what he implied. The 
three pence tax referred to the 1773 tax on tea which 
triggered a series of events leading to the Boston Tea Party 
and, ultimately, revolution. 25 Madison argued that 
establishment carried the same seeds of tyranny as the Tea 
Act, but was clothed in a different guise. He pointed out 
the precedent of this act, taken by itself, like the Tea 
Act, did not seem destructive. However, viewed in context 
both acts were part of a grand plot against liberty. 
Harkening his readers back to the Revolution, Madison again 
linked political and religious actions, reminding them that 
religion and politics were complementary bedfellows when 
used by those intent on tyranny. Establishment provided 
only one step toward subjugation, but an important one. 
America, Madison reminded his readers, owed its liberty to 
acting before it was too late. 
Madison drew one more parallel to show the danger of 
establishment. The bill for establishment, "distant as it 
may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs 
24 Ibid., 8:300. 
25 Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:351. 
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only in degree. " 26 Madison again revealed his classical 
fear that one step of corruption would eventually lead to 
tyranny. Precedent here as well was important. The analogy 
Madison drew to show the possible consequences of the bill 
must have grabbed the attention of readers both for and 
against the measure. The terror of the Inquisition combined 
with the more recent hysteria over the Quebec Act, and the 
fear it generated for its supposed support of "popery," 
divulged Madison's deep concern about the bill. If any 
tyrant rivaled King George in the colonists mind, it was the 
Catholic Church. Madison painted a picture designed to 
shock in order to expose the threat present. 
Was Madison guilty of using scare tactics? Perhaps, 
but the threat seemed real to him. He studied history and 
had lived through the events that sparked Revolution. 
Moreover, he matured as an adult and began his political 
career at a time when Whig ideology, characterized by a 
paranoid fear of tyranny, corruption, and conspiracy, held 
sway over many Americans. Madison, moreover, had picked the 
right time to act like a paranoid Whig. Irving Brant has 
remarked that "Memorial and Remonstrance" was Madison's 
greatest contribution to religious liberty. According to 
Brant, Madison looked beyond a "seemingly trivial levy in 
aid of religious teachers, and saw its ultimate consequence 
26 JM, "Memorial and Remonstrance," 20 June 1785, 
8:302. 
38 
in the denial of liberty and imposition of clerical control 
upon the state."27 A true Whig in this respect, Madison 
judged the legislation not only by its immediate impact, but 
also by its ends, asking how it endangered liberty. 
The fear of conspiratorial plots against liberty never 
left Madison's mind. Not surprisingly, during the bitter 
party feuds of the 1790s, one finds Madison describing the 
Federalists as "Anglicans. " 28 He reminded his readers 
which party carried the ideals of the Revolution, the 
Jeffersonians. "They have maintained ... a deep conviction of 
the danger to liberty and Constitution ... and have sometimes 
been reprehended in debate for an excess of caution and 
jealousy."29 The diligent guard needed to uncover new 
plots against liberty should never be relaxed. Americans, 
who had the good fortune to possess the "inestimatable 
blessing of a free and defined constitution cannot be too 
watchful, nor too critical in tracing the consequences of 
new principles ... that may remove the landmarks of power. " 30 
The fear of tyranny via religious bodies also remained 
uppermost in Madison's mind. While he understood that 
27 Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:351. 
28 JM, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 2 September, 1793, 
15:92-93. 
29 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder: Sources of 
the Political Thought of James Madison, "Political 
Observations," 20 April 1795, 287. 
30 Ibid., "Letters of Helvidius," Gazette of the United 
States, No.4, 14 September 1793, 274. 
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corruption of political power could appear at any time, he 
also held that too little political authority proved as 
great a vice as too much. 31 With regard to religion, 
however, he never changed. While some political power was 
necessary for popular government, religion to his mind 
should never gain coercive power. In his "Essay on 
.Monopolies, " 32 Madison reiterated his belief in keeping 
religious bodies from any kind of political power and 
maintaining a diligent watch for the first signs of tyranny. 
Referring again to the Tea Act of 1773, Madison maintained 
that Americans "owe their independence and their liberty to 
the wisdom of descrying in the minute tax of three pence on 
tea, the magnitude of the evil comprised in the precedent." 
The threat of tyranny would always exist, and citizens would 
be wise to guard "against silent accumulations and 
encroachments by ecclesiastical bodies." Madison then 
emphasized that examples of such encroachment "may be 
illustrated by precedents already furnished in their [the 
United States] short history." 33 Failure to keep religion 
31 Ibid., James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 
1788, 208. 
32 The correct title for the article is "Monopolies, 
Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastic Endowments." I 
have chosen to use it by the abbreviated name Brant employed 
for the sake of brevity. Hereafter it will be cited as 
"Essay on Monopolies." See the following footnote for 
bibliographical information. 
33 James Madison, "Essay on Monopolies," quoted in 
Irving Brant, "Madison: On Separation of Church and State,", 
21-22. 
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out of government destroyed the "great barrier" that kept 
spiritual tyranny shackled. Crevices would appear, "through 
which bigotry may introduce persecution; a monster that 
feeding and thriving on its own venom gradually swells to a 
size and strength overwhelming all laws divine & human." 34 
A vivid picture of tyranny, complete tyranny, Madison 
painted once more. Although known for his reserved manner, 
the subject of tyranny led him to reveal his inner emotions 
more deeply than any other. 
In his opposition to ecclesiastical establishment 
Madison showed that protection of conscience required, for 
him, republican vigilance. Republican doctrine stressed the 
endless diligence of citizens watching for acts that usurped 
power or created dangerous tendencies that led to 
subjugation. This fear of tyranny bordered on obsession for 
some Radical Whigs. Madison, in this respect, stands fully 
in the classical tradition. Whatever inconsistencies may be 
found in Madison in other regards, there was none in his 
fear of, and opposition to political and religious 
oppression. 
Madison's fear of tyranny revealed one aspect of his 
classical philosophy, that of Radical Whiggery; yet in a 
different way so does his view of the Senate. The 
ideological influence that shaped his perception of the 
34 James Madison, "Essay on Monopolies," quoted in 
Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:355. 
41 
Senate did not draw on English Opposition thought. Madison 
regarded the Senate as the bastion of wisdom, stability, 
reason, and virtue. In this sense he drew on Montesquieu as 
well as Enlightenment philosophy which stressed the role of 
reason. 
Pluralist scholars, and more generally, historians who 
.employ the liberal paradigm to describe the founding periods 
tend to view the Constitution and James Madison as 
instrumental in destroying the need for virtue in republican 
government. According to this line of reasoning, Madison's 
genius existed in constructing a popular government that 
thrived in a society dominated by interests. Virtue had no 
place in the new government, and Madison's mentioning, in 
one letter, of the need for virtue, one historian has passed 
off as a "moment of anxiety. 1135 
Gary Wills, however, has correctly pointed out that 
this kind of reading is much too selective. 36 Any 
interpretation that paints Madison as discounting the need 
for virtue fails to consider the values and roles he 
assigned to the Senate. Like Montesquieu, Madison saw the 
need for virtue in government. 
Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws, considered it a 
35 John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: 
Virtue, Self Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism, 
68. 
36 Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist, (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1981), 189. Wills refered, in this 
instance, to Robert Dahl's Deadlock of Democracy. 
maxim of republican government that the divisions of land 
should be equal and small. 37 The theorist realized, 
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however, "an equal division of lands cannot be established 
in all democracies." Circumstances would arise which would 
make an equal division of land impracticable, dangerous, 
"and even subversive of the constitution." "If it appears 
that this division of lands, which was designed to preserve 
the people's morals, does not suit the democracy, recourse 
must be made to other methods. " 38 Montesquieu solved this 
difficult question by recommending the creation of a Senate. 
The great theorist saw the Senate as a permanent body "to 
which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent service procure 
admittance. " 39 Because of their concern for the public 
good, Senators would provide a role model for citizens, and 
inspire the sentiments of virtue within the citizens. 
Because of the admirable qualities and stability they gave 
to government, Montesquieu advocated electing Senators for 
life. 40 
While Madison rejected Montesquieu's theories about 
republics existing in small areas and consisting of a 
homogenous population, his understanding of the Senate's 
role paralleled the French thinker's in important ways. 
37 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1:2:6:45. 
38 Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 7 . 
39 Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 7 . 
40 Ibid. , 1 : 2 : 7 : 4 8 . 
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First he expounded on Montesquieu's idea that an equal 
division of property was not possible in some popular 
governments. Madison believed such a division impossible; 
indeed the most "common and durable source of factions has 
been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of 
property. 1141 The distinctive feature of the Senate, 
however, stemmed from its ability to proceed "with more 
coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom ... " 42 In 
a society prone to faction, a wise and virtuous Senate 
advanced the public good. 43 
41 The Federalist Papers, (New York: Mentor Books, 
1961), 10: 19. This method refers to the appropriate number 
and page. 
42 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), 83. 
Hereafter cited as Notes. 
43 See Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the 
American Constitution (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc, 1986), 121. Riemer sees the importance of 
the Senate in Madison's thought, but does not trace the 
possible ideological influences or elaborate in much detail 
on the subject. Jack Rakove's "Madisonian Moment," 
University of Chicago Law Review, 55.2 (Spring 1988): 473-
505, also points to Madison describing the Senate advancing 
the public good. However, Rakove feels the ideological 
origins of such thoughts are Burkean. Ibid., 483. I find no 
evidence in Madison's writings to support such a theory. 
The case for Montesquieu seems more plausible to me. During 
his preparatory schooling under Donald Robertson before 
entering Princeton, Madison had access to Montesquieu's 
Spirit of the Laws, and probably gained his initial 
acquaintance with the author there. See JM, Editorial Note, 
1:5, and Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:59. While at 
Princeton, Madison also came into contact with Montesquieu. 
President John Witherspoon used The Spirit of the Laws as a 
textbook. See Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:76. In 
addition, Burke is mentioned only once in Madison's 
writings, and that occurred when Madison, as part of a 
Congressional Committee to compile a bibliography for a 
44 
In 1785, Madison responded to a letter from Caleb 
Wallace asking for help in forming the constitution for the 
future state of Kentucky. Madison's first words of advice 
dealt with the Legislative branch and the importance of the 
Senate. "By all means" one should include "a Senate 
constituted on such principles as will give wisdom and 
steadiness to legislation. 1144 The Senate must watch over 
the "aggregate interests" of the entire community. 
Madison's belief that a properly constituted Senate would 
act for the common good was so strong he originally 
suggested that the veto power over the state legislatures be 
lodged in the Senate, not the executive. 45 Can it be 
coincidence that the last words of Madison-Publius concerned 
the Senate? Madison argued in Federalist 63 that the 
utility and authority of the Senate would stem from "such a 
display of enlightened policy and attachment to the public 
good, as will divide that branch of [the] legislature the 
affections and support of the entire body of the people. " 46 
Like Montesquieu, Madison believed that the Senate's actions 
possible library for Congress, cited Burke's Annual 
Register. When Madison specified men of authority, only 
Locke appeared above Montesquieu in the number of times 
cited. No one else is cited even half as many times as 
these two. 
44 JM _, 
45 See 
9:370, and 
9:384. 
Madison to Caleb Wallace, 23 August 1785, 8:350. 
JM, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 7 April 1787, 
Madison to George Washington, 16 April 1787, 
46 The Federalist Papers, 63: 390. 
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would command the people's respect, and thus foster virtue 
within the people by example. 
The need for a disinterested body devoted to the public 
good originated in Madison's mind in the 1780s when he 
served in both the Continental Congress and Virginia House 
of Delegates. Madison despised the overriding concern with 
local interests when trying to legislate for the entire 
nation. Before the Constitutional Convention he confided to 
Edmund Randolph that he hoped local prejudices would have no 
place in the formation of the new government. 47 The Jay-
Gardoqui talks of 1786 had impressed Madison for their lack 
of "just and extended maxims of policy," which promoted the 
prosperity of the Union, and the "predominance of temporary 
and partial interests" which attempted to give up the right 
of navigation on the Mississippi. 48 State representatives, 
furthermore, frequently displayed the character of partisans 
for their respective states rather than "impartial guardians 
of a common interest. 1149 Particularly singled out for 
criticism by Madison were supporters of paper money schemes. 
Such men seemed unconcerned with the long term effects of 
legislative measures. "Is it to be imagined that an 
ordinary citizen or even assemblyman of Rhode Island in 
47 JM, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 8 April 1787, 8:369. 
48 Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 5 October 1786, 
9:141. 
49 The Federalist Papers, 46: 296-297. 
46 
estimating the policy of paper money ever considered or 
cared, in what light the measure would be viewed in France 
or Holland; or even in Massachusetts or Connecticut."50 
The need for an enlightened body was clear to Madison. The 
question was how to construct a Senate so that cosmopolitan, 
dispassionate legislators capable of "discerning the true 
.public good" won election. 51 
An effective remedy for removing men of narrow or local 
prejudices consisted of "process of elections as will most 
certainly extract from the mass of society the purest and 
noblest characters. " 52 Madison favored picking Senators by 
the people at large, or by the creation of large interstate 
districts. 53 Such a method made it difficult "for unworthy 
candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by 
which elections are too often carried."54 The larger the 
district, the more interests within that district, the less 
50 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Vices of 
the Political System of the United States," April 1787, 90. 
51 Jack Rakove, "Madisonian Moment," 482. 
52 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Vices of 
the Political System of the United States," April 1787, 91. 
53 In the Virginia Plan, Madison originally called for 
the election of Senators by the House. However, once the 
convention began he quickly shifted to favor election by the 
people at large or by large interstate districts. Either he 
had not convinced himself of the efficacy of such a plan, or 
the idea was not Madison's originally. Brant felt Madison 
switched his position because election by the people would 
give Senators more independence. See Irving Brant, James 
Madison, 3:80. 
54 The Federalist Papers, 10:82. 
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chance there was of an elected official representing one 
interest winning election.ss Election by district 
increased the odds that local, demagogic Senators would gain 
off ice and pursue only the narrow interests of the 
constituency they represented. They lost sight of the 
aggregate good of the community. Madison, therefore, 
criticized Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia" in 1788 for 
advocating election of Senators by district.s6 To impress 
upon Senators the need to focus their attention on the 
general interests of all, Madison felt a process of 
elections in which the entire citizenry of the state voted 
for their Senators proved best.s7 
In this vein Jack Rakove has argued that Madison's 
ideal Senate was to be elected by constituencies 
sufficiently large to erase any degree of electoral 
accountability.ss While Rakove exaggerated in saying 
Madison wanted Senators to be free of accountability, he 
touched on an aspect of the Senate Madison thought 
important, a method of election designed to pick virtuous 
men, who also had a measure of independence accorded them in 
ss See The Federalist Papers, 10:83, for a concise 
summary of Madison's theory of representation. 
s6 Robert J. Morgan, "Madison's Theory of 
Representation in the Tenth Federalist," Journal of 
Politics, 36.4 (1974): 852-888, 863. 
s7 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Critique of 
Jefferson's Notes on Virginia," October 1788, 57. 
ss Jack Rakove, "Madisonian Moment," 482. 
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order to promote the public good. 
Independence for Senators meant they could act as 
disinterested legislators. Madison confided to Edmund 
Pendleton in October, 1788, that some degree of impartiality 
must exist in even despotic governments. In Republics, 
however, impartiality "may be considered as the vital 
.Principle of the Administration. " 59 Impartiality meant 
exercising independent judgment. It seems ironic, then, 
that Madison failed to get elected to the Senate because he 
possessed the very trait he expected members of the upper 
House to exhibit. Patrick Henry, still smarting from his 
defeat in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, kept 
Madison out of the Senate by spreading the rumors that 
Madison would not obey state legislative instructions. 60 
To Madison longer terms for Senators contributed to 
their freedom of action, but more importantly they furnished 
59 JM, Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 20 October 1788, 
11:306. 
60 JM, George Lee Turberville to James Madison, 10 
November 1788, 11:339. Madison was well aware that Henry's 
influence would keep him out of the Senate. In a November 
2, 1788, letter to Edmund Randolph, Madison tells Randolph 
he would prefer to serve in the House. The Senate was out 
of the question due to Henry's dislike of him. JM, 11:329. 
Henry, however, had good reason to make such accusations of 
Madison. In 1783 Virginia had withdrawn its support of the 
five percent impost bill. Madison, then serving in the 
Continental Congress, continued to support the measure. 
While torn by his decision, Madison felt, ultimately, his 
allegiance to the public good and his own conscience must 
overcome his fidelity to Virginia. He would risk his 
political career to stand for a measure he felt essential to 
the welfare of the nation. JM, Notes on Debates, 28 January 
1783, 147. 
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the means to consider long term national goals. Six year 
terms, he observed, permitted the Senate to enact measures 
"which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation." 
Such measures were critical, in Madison's mind, for the 
general welfare of any society. The House, by contrast, 
consisted of members elected for terms so short that they 
proved "unable to provide more than one or two links in a 
chain of measures, on which the general welfare may 
essentially depend." 61 Longer terms provided continuity to 
legislation some continuity, and also pointed to a feature 
of the Senate that Madison felt America needed most, 
stability. 
By 1787 Madison felt that the colonies stood on the 
brink of dissolution. Inadequate government financing, 
paper money schemes, inter-state commercial struggles, and 
Shays' Rebellion, fueled Madison's concern for the state of 
the Union. 62 Even Congress came in for its share of 
criticism. In 1783 he watched with distaste the antics of 
new Congressmen in a minor debate over consular power. In 
the end nothing was resolved, which caused Madison to write 
that experience "constantly teaches" that new members of a 
public body failed to act with the proper respect towards 
61 The Federalist Papers, 63:383. 
62 For a good discussion on Madison's fear of disunion, 
consult the third chapter of Neal Riemer's James Madison: 
Creating the American Constitution. 
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the acts of their predecessors. Members had not studied the 
issues or become acquainted with present circumstances, a 
grievous sin in Madison's eyes. 63 He concluded that a 
change of legislative "members & circumstances often proves 
fatal to the consistency and stability of public 
measures. " 64 In an insightful exchange of letters with 
Philip Mazzei in 1788, Madison defended the Constitution 
because it supplied steadiness. Stunned by Mazzei's 
implication in an earlier letter that his support of the 
Constitution was anti-republican, Madison fired back that 
"experience has proved that the real danger to America & 
liberty lies in the defect of energy and stability in the 
present establishments of the United States." 65 Obviously, 
then, by the time of the Constitutional Convention Madison 
thought it vital "that a stable and firm Government, 
63 Madison, by contrast, during his first six months in 
Congress made no motions and ''probably never entered a 
debate.'' Lance Banning, "James Madison and the 
Nationalists," William and Mary Quarterly, 40.2 (April 
1983), 230. Madison's reason for keeping such a low profile 
probably stemmed from his natural shyness, weak voice, and 
his tendency not to enter into a fracas until he had 
prepared himself adequately. 
64 JM, Notes, 6 January 1783, 6:16. Madison reiterated 
these same thoughts in The Federalist Papers, 62:188. 
65 JM, Madison to Philip Mazzei, 8 October 1788, 
11:278. Madison went on in his letter to say that he 
understood why Mazzei felt as he did. The Frenchman labored 
under a system in which there was too much government, while 
the opposite had proved true for Madison. Madison concluded 
by saying that both he and Mazzei would feel differently if 
each exchanged places with the other. 
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organized in the republican form," be constructed. 66 
The Upper House provided Madison the governmental 
stability he sought. "The Senate was to commonwealth what 
ballast is to a ship. " 67 "One great end" of the Senate 
was, "that being a firm, wise, and impartial body," it would 
give "stability to the General Government in its operation 
on individuals. " 68 By giving "that stability which was 
called for everywhere," Americans could rebuke "Enemies of 
the Republican form," who alleged that steadiness in 
government was contrary to the nature of republicanism. 69 
Not surprisingly, then, Madison advocated long terms for 
Senators. He hinted that even a nine year term might not 
prove too long and supported seven years with some 
reservations. Madison worried that a seven year term for 
Senators would still leave that branch impotent in the face 
of the more numerous House. 70 
A chronic worrier, Madison obviously overreacted to the 
lack of stability in America. In this instance, his 
determination to endow the Senate with stability drew him 
away from the suppositions of Radical Whiggery, which 
66 James Madison, Notes, 12 June 1787, 110. 
67 Alexander Hamilton, Pay Book of the State Company of 
Artillery, 1777. Quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776-1787, 210. 
68 James Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 199. 
69 Ibid., 12 June 1787, 110-111. 
70 Irving Brant, James Madison, 3:48. 
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stressed rotation in office and short terms in order to 
guarantee the renewal of virtue. 71 In this sense he looked 
to the other, Montesquieuian, side of classical 
republicanism. Madison, like Montesquieu, required the 
presence of a wise and virtuous Senate to balance both 
government and community. 
If virtue and stability emanated from the second house 
of the legislative body, Madison expected one more quality 
to characterize the Senate's action. Virtue by itself was 
not enough. Madison was a philosopher, as Adrienne Koch has 
put it, "perhaps the best this nation has ever produced." 72 
Living in the era of the American Enlightenment, Madison 
looked to the Senate to provide reason and systematic study 
of legislation. Virtue and stability had to be tied to the 
means best capable of achieving them, wisdom. 
As the stronghold of reason the Senate could offer 
guidance that both the people and government, at times, 
lacked. Although the American people "are an enlightened 
and liberal people ... they are not all philosophers." 73 
Gary Wills has also pointed out that Madison accepted the 
distinctions between heart and head, which appeared in The 
71 J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 519. 
72 Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great 
Collaboration (London: Oxford University Press, 1973, 
reprint of 1950 edition by Alfred A. Knopf), 291. 
73 JM, Madison to Philip Mazzei, 8 October 1788, 
11:278. 
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Federalist. 74 State legislatures, had, at times, good 
intentions, but failed to convert them into coherent 
policies. Good government meant devotion to the public 
good, but also to "a knowledge by which that object [the 
public good] can be best attained." Americans, according to 
Madison had paid "too little attention" to this important 
.Principle. 75 
Madison's language revealed constantly the necessity of 
linking virtue and wisdom. Whenever Madison talked about 
the Senate, usually wisdom or some other synonym for it 
appears first. Use of reason, however, also consisted of 
proceeding in a detached, scientific manner. Madison, then, 
described members of the upper house as acting with "more 
coolness and system" to him the Senate was a "temperate and 
respectable" body. 76 Led by no permanent interest, 
Senators could devote themselves to the study of law and 
"the affairs and comprehensive interests of their 
country. 1177 Dedicated to securing reason a place in 
government, Madison's thought did not differ from the 
prominent ideological understanding of human powers of his 
time. While rationality was supposed to reign supreme over 
74 Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist, 186. 
75 The Federalist Papers, 62:187. 
76 James Madison, Notes, 7 June 1787, 83, and The 
Federalist Papers, 63:384. 
77 The Federalist Papers, 62:379. 
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the passions, self interest led men to act in ways contrary 
to reason. 79 Naturally, Madison looked favorably on that 
institution which subjugated interest to reason. 
Madison favored, therefore, Senatorial appointment of 
judges because that body would use their "deliberate 
judgement." 79 Both in the Constitutional Convention and 
The Federalist, Madison pointed to the salutary check the 
Senate could impose on "impetuous" legislation and the rash 
acts of the people. 80 As he noted in The Federalist, the 
Senate would "suspend the blow the people aimed at 
themselves until reason, justice, and truth can retain 
authority." Their deliberate manner would allow them to 
"escape a variety of errors in the exercise of the 
legislative trust." 91 Also significant for Madison was the 
Senate's ability to throw their weight to the side of 
justice to prevent the majority from endangering the 
fundamental rights of minorities. 92 Finally the Senate was 
to serve as a watchdog over government. It was to guard 
78 Daniel W. Howe, "The Political Psychology of The 
Federalist," William and Mary Quarterly, 44.3, (July 1987): 
485-509, 487-491. 
79 James Madison, Notes, 5 June 1787, 68. 
BO Ibid., 83. 
81 The Federalist Papers, 63:383-384. See also James 
Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 193. 
82 James Madison, Notes, 26 June 1787, 194-195. 
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against governmental tyranny. 83 The Senate, then, enhanced 
the common interest of all by acting deliberately, and by 
ensuring the legislative process remained true to the 
principles of justice. 
Such was Madison's theoretical picture of the Senate, 
stable, dedicated to the public good, and possessing the 
intellectual qualities necessary for discerning and acting 
to promote the aggregate good of all. However, much to 
Madison's chagrin, the Senate's actions under the 
Constitution showed quickly that it could act in an 
unvirtuous manner, yet he held fast to his original 
conception of that body. 
This became apparent to Madison in 1789, as took part 
in the debate over the proper titles for the President and 
Vice-President that Senator (and former Anti-Federalist) 
Richard Henry Lee initiated in the upper body's first 
session. Madison recoiled against the pompous titles Lee 
favored. They diminished the "true dignity" of both 
Washington and republican government. 84 A similar 
controversy recurred in 1790 when the Senate considered a 
83 For a concise and persuasive article on the Senate's 
utility as a check against governmental tyranny, consult 
George Carey, "Separation of Powers & the Madisonian Model: 
A Reply to the Critics," American Political Science Review, 
72 (March 1978): 151-164. 
84 James Madison, Congressional Speech, quoted in 
Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison, 102. 
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bill which attached the title of "honorable" to Senators. 85 
Here, Madison believed, the Senate threatened to inflict "a 
deep wound to our infant government." 86 Madison had to 
endure more actions he thought betrayed the essence of that 
institution. The Senate was directly responsible for twice 
defeating his bills of commercial discrimination in 1789 and 
1794, measures whose passage Madison considered critical to 
the welfare of the nation. The Senate, furthermore, 
originated the hated Bank bill and passed the bill on 
Assumption. Yet despite the empirical evidence that spoke 
to the contrary, and the fact that locally oriented state 
legislators elected Senators, Madison continued to hold to 
his original theoretical conception of the Upper House. 87 
The persistence of Madison's conception of the Senate 
as the vessel of virtue is evident from his acts during the 
first year of the new government. In the fight over pay 
differentiation between Senate and House during the first 
85 JM, Madison to William Short, 6 April 1790, 11:140. 
86 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 9 May 1789, 
quoted in Irving Brant's James Madison, 3:256. 
87 The evidence in the next paragraph of the text 
contradicts Rakove's assertion that with the election of 
Senators by state legislators went Madison's hope for the 
choosing of wise and virtuous men to fill the upper house. 
See Jack Rakove's ''Madisonian Moment," 484. For an opinion 
that argues that the Constitutional Convention convinced 
Madison of the validity of a federal influence in Congress, 
see Lance Banning's "The Practical Sphere of a Republic," 
especially 183-187, in Richard Beeman, ed., et al. Beyond 
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American 
National Identity (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987): 162-187. 
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session of Congress in 1789, Madison supported paying the 
former a slightly higher salary. He supported this hopeless 
motion, moreover, during his time as a member of the House. 
A difference in pay, Madison reminded House members during a 
July 1789 speech, would recruit for the Senate "men of 
abilities and firm principles." Such men needed prompting 
so that they may be "induced to devote the experience of 
years, and the acquisitions of study, to the service of 
their country. 1188 Madison re-iterated these same thoughts 
in a letter to Wilson Cary Nicholaus. Pay discrimination 
needed to become a reality because the "utility of the 
Senate will depend on its being composed of the first 
characters." 89 Three years later in 1792, amidst bitter 
political feuding, Madison found himself attacked in an 
anonymous pamphlet for his support of the pay discrimination 
between House and Senate members. Irritated, he replied in 
"Notes on Politics & Views" that rewards for public service 
should be in proportion to the private sacrifices. No man, 
Madison maintained, should hang his head over supporting pay 
discrimination. "The utility of the Senate will depend on 
the respectability of its characters. 119° Four years after 
passage of the Constitution, and now finding himself firmly 
88 JM, Congressional Speech, 16 July 1789, 12:293. 
89 Ibid., Madison to Wilson Cary Nicholaus, 18 June 
1789, 12:295. Emphasis in the original. 
90 Ibid., Notes on Politics & Views, 4 November 1792, 
14:399. 
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allied with Jefferson, Madison still clung to his vision of 
a respectable, educated, and experienced Senate advancing 
the public interest. 
Madison's stubborn insistence that wise and virtuous 
men existed and would make their way into the Senate was 
echoed by many other revolutionaries versed in classical 
theory. These men were confident there existed in the 
community a "senatorial part," a natural and intellectual 
elite that could govern in the interests of all. 91 The 
idea that Madison discarded classical ideology with its 
emphasis on virtue fails as soon as one starts to examine 
his views on government. Virtue and wisdom were the 
fundamental qualities Madison prescribed for a united and 
stable United States. While the mass of society could not 
always be expected to act virtuously, Madison, like 
Montesquieu, clearly expected the Senate to behave in a 
manner that demonstrated its devotion to the public good. 
Yet if Madison imparted a classical understanding of 
the need for virtue in government, he also displayed a 
radical Whig mentality which stressed the importance of 
republican jealousy. This paranoid mentality, frequently 
concerned with threats to liberty both religious and 
governmental, formed an essential part of Madison's 
ideological character. Diligent attention, he believed 
91 Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic; 
1776-1787, 209. 
fervently, must be paid to government's action in order to 
spot early signs of tyrannical corruption. Once detected, 
citizens must stifle such tendencies at their advent. Such 
qualities seemed necessary in Madison's eyes for the 
Republic's preservation. To overlook or discount the 
classical Madison is to miss an important aspect of his 
thought. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LIBERAL MADISON: NATURAL RIGHTS AND INTEREST 
The importance of republican ideology in Madison's 
thought has now gained legitimacy in historiographical 
circles, due in large part to the diligence of Lance Banning 
and Drew McCoy. Similarly, Stephen Watts' recent study on 
liberalism and republicanism in the early republic depicts 
Madison "as an ideological shaper of Jeffersonian 
Republicanism." 1 Yet to describe Madison solely through 
republican eyes misses the liberal aspect of his thought. 
Radical Whig and Montesquieuian republicanism can be 
described as Madison's means to protect the republic, but 
Lockean principles constituted his end. Republican 
principles and institutions were, for Madison, guardians of 
natural rights. Thus, as important as his republican 
principles were, alone they do not fully capture his 
thought. Equally important was the liberal side of Madison' 
mind. Although the subject of considerable study, the 
liberal Madison remains misunderstood. 
Conventional liberal interpretations search for 
Madison's liberal principles in The Federalist. His 
1 Stephen Watts, The Republic Reborn: War in the Making 
of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 1987), 311. 
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masterful extended republic theory, found in the tenth 
paper, described how the size of the country bred a 
multiplicity of interests, which in turn allowed for their 
negation, insuring that no interest could arise to control 
government. 2 In this regard, Madison-Publius described 
interest in a negative way. Yet Madison's other writings--
indeed a multitude of them--insisted that promotion of 
interest was far from evil, showing the skewed and shallow 
historical understanding of Madison's theory of interest 
needs correction. 
Another prominent view of Madison describes him as an 
elitist who helped design a system of government to protect 
the propertied elite from majority rule. Scholars such as 
John Patrick Diggins are especially critical of Madison's 
defense of property and minority rights. However, a 
thorough and broad study of Madison's theories of property 
and minority rights discloses that his dedication to such 
principles extended far beyond protecting the property of 
wealthy Americans. In fact, his theories in this matter 
encompassed a broad range of minority groups outside of the 
elite classes. Madison's defense of property and minority 
rights went much further than the preservation of the 
2 For an extended analysis of faction and the extended 
republic, see Neal Riemer's James Madison: Creating the 
American Constitution, chapter five; and Jack Rakove's 
"James Madison and the Extended Republic: Theory and 
Practice in American Politics," This Constitution, 3 (1984): 
16-22. 
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colonial social hierarchy. His defense in this matter 
demonstrated a logical application of natural law to civil 
society. For Madison, majority rule was the pivot upon 
which republican government turned. As Drew McCoy has 
correctly observed, Madison's "preoccupation with the perils 
of majority rule must not be confused with a rejection of 
the principle itself."3 Madison's goals in 1787 and at the 
end of his life remained the same, "minimizing the risk of 
majority rule without abandoning the cause" of the system 
that was "the least flawed," popular government. 4 Yet true 
to Lockean doctrine, he maintained that a government based 
on majority rule could never violate natural rights. To 
this end, no one worked harder than Madison to secure 
individual rights, especially the right of conscience, and 
elevate them to the same sacred plane as property. 
Furthermore, when Madison put into practice his theory of 
protecting minorities, he did not work to promote the upper 
classes. On the contrary, he labored to protect the 
nation's religious and social outcasts, Baptists, Catholics, 
Quakers and even Jews. His theory of minority rights 
echoed natural law precepts in many respects and pushed 
beyond them in others. 
That Madison was as close a student of Locke as he was 
3 Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 137. 
4 Ibid., 137, and Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the 
Founder, "Majority Governments," 530. 
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of Montesquieu and other republican thinkers is beyond 
question. He was, in particular, familiar with book two of 
Locke's Treatises on Civil Government, where the English 
philosopher sketched the development of civil society. 
Prior to formation of civil society, Locke held, all men 
lived in a state of nature with complete freedom. The 
,Problem with "eden", however, lay in the fact it contained 
no security. 5 Problems arose from each man being able to 
interpret and act upon the law of nature individually. Men 
acting as "judges in their own case" naturally had the 
tendency to act in their own interest. 6 
Locke noted that the end of civil society consisted of 
remedying the "inconveniences of the state of nature ... by 
setting up a known authority to appeal to ... which everyone 
of society ought to obey." 7 The social contract, by which 
all participants agreed to become part of a society, was for 
Locke based on one important principle, the protection of 
property. Locke referred to this idea continually 
throughout the Second Treatise and made clear that his 
definition of property extended beyond material possession. 
5 Basil Wiley, The Seventeenth Century Background (New 
York: Doubleday, 1935), 265. 
6 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter 
Laslett, (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge at the 
University Press, 1960), 2:2:13:293. This citation method 
refers to book, chapter, section, and page numbers. Two 
Treatises of Government hereafter cited as Treatises. 
7 Ibid., 2:7:85:341. 
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Civil society, he emphasized, existed to preserve the 
people's "lives, liberties and Estates, which I call by the 
general name Property." 8 
Once the social contract was entered into, all who 
joined were to abide by the will of the majority, which was 
to exhibit its sovereignty through a legislative body. 9 
~hile the legislature ruled with the "preservation of 
society" as its fundamental purpose, the body was limited in 
certain respects. Locke argued that the Legislative power 
"cannot take from any man part of his Property without his 
consent. 1110 Since the preservation of property comprised 
the reason which individuals joined civil society, it seemed 
absurd to force them to abandon it. Such activities 
diminished a person's natural freedom, whereby the end of 
law "is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and 
enlarge freedom." 11 There exists, then, in Lockean theory 
an essential tension. On the one hand, majority rule 
provided the foundation of civil society; on the other hand 
the authority of the majority could never be used to deprive 
a person or persons of their natural rights. 
Madison became acquainted with the works of Locke at 
an early age. While attending the boarding school of Donald 
8 Ibid., 2:9:123:368. Emphasis in original. 
9 Ibid., 2:8:95:348-349. 
10 Ibid., 2:11:138:378. Emphasis in original. 
11 Ibid., 2:6:54:324. 
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Robertson in the 1760s, he had his first contact with 
Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding." Madison's notebook, 
"A Brief System of Logick (sic)," contained his lecture 
notes from classes at Princeton. The notebook revealed his 
continuing fascination with Locke's "Essay." 12 Madison 
made his admiration for Locke clear in a comparison between 
Locke and Montesquieu, another man he had held in esteem. 
Montesquieu, Madison wrote in 1792, "was in politics not a 
Newton or a Locke, [both] who established immortal systems--
the one in matter, the other in mind." 13 Later in his life 
when discussing with Jefferson textbooks for law students at 
the University of Virginia, Madison emphasized the need for 
Locke's works. It was important, he held, that the 
doctrines of liberty, manifested in American politics, "be 
inculcated on those" who would sustain and administer it. 
"Sidney and Locke are admirably calculated to impress on 
young minds the rights of nations to establish their own 
government, and to inspire a love of free ones." 14 
12 Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:58-59, and JM, 
Editorial Notes on a "Brief System of Logick," 32-35. 
13 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "The Spirit 
of Governments," National Gazette, 20 February 1792, 239. 
14 Ibid., Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 8 February 1825, 
444. It is interesting that Madison mentions both Sidney and 
Locke as essential to understanding the formation of 
government and securing of liberty. The main thrust of this 
thesis argues that Madison should be interpreted as sui 
generous, and Madison's comment above seems to be a parcel 
of added proof. Algernon Sidney belongs to radical whig or 
republican ideology, while Locke stands as the heir of 
liberalism. Both, however, are important in Madison's eyes. 
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Madison's affinity for Lockean principles manifested 
itself in his constant references to natural law. 
Commenting to Edmund Randolph about the impact of the 
American Revolution abroad, he stated that all of Europe 
would slowly "be roused to the recollection and assertion of 
the rights of human nature." In a 1785 letter to Lafayette, 
he maintained that the Spanish government would fail in its 
attempt to permanently close the Mississippi to American 
navigation for "nature seems on all sides to be reasserting 
those rights which have so long been trampled on by bigotry 
and tyranny." 15 In a 1793 letter, accepting an offer of 
French citizenship from the revolutionary government, 
Madison wrote that he was grateful to have played a role in 
"reclaiming the lost rights of mankind." 16 
Madison also articulated other Lockean doctrines. In 
Federalist 43, he appealed to natural law and the consent of 
the governed as justification for the Constitutional 
Convention. In the third essay of his Helvidius series, he 
maintained the efficacy of revolution, peaceful or by 
bloodshed. "Every nation," he argued, "has the right to 
abolish an old government and establish a new one." 17 One 
can also find Madison lecturing on aspects of the social 
15 JM, Madison to Lafayette, 20 March 1785, 8:251. 
16 Ibid., Madison to French Minister of the Interior, 
April 1793, 15:4. 
17 Ibid., Helvidius 3, 7 September 1793, 15:98. 
contract in Continental Congress debates over Kentucky 
statehood and in the Constitutional Convention during 
discussion of the New Jersey Plan. 18 
Yet an exchange of letters with Jefferson over the 
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former's doctrine of "the earth belongs to the living" best 
showed how closely Madison had read Locke. In this instance 
he displayed his knowledge of the Second Treatise to be 
greater than that of his radical friend. Jefferson argued 
that no generation should be bound by the debts or laws of 
preceding generations. Natural law presupposed that all 
have a part in forming the society in which they live. All 
must give their express consent. Madison refuted one part 
of his friend's idea, arguing that current generations are 
bound to the past by the improvements or sacrifices their 
predecessors had made. Madison, moreover, saw Jefferson's 
scheme as very impractical, a vessel of chaos. 19 In a 
philosophic manner, he deflated Jefferson's appeal to 
natural law by arguing that people agree to a government and 
Constitution by giving a tacit assent to the country's laws 
and political structure. 20 "Tacit assent ... is to be 
18 See Ibid., Constitutional Convention Speech, 19 June 
1787, 10:55, Congressional Speech, 27 August 1782, 5:83 
19 For a full treatment of this debate see JM, 
Jefferson to Madison, 6 September 1789, 12:382-388, Madison 
to Jefferson, 4 February 1790, 13:18-26. See also chapter 
four of Adrienne Koch's, Jefferson and Madison. 
20 Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison, 72. 
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inferred from the omission of express revocation. " 21 In 
this regard Madison echoed Locke, for the English 
philosopher had anticipated that someone might take his 
theory of natural law to argue that the laws and government 
of civil society could not bind those who, for a variety of 
reasons, were not present during the formation of the social 
contract. The Second Treatise states: 
The difficulty is, what ought to be look'd upon as 
a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how 
far anyone shall be looked on to have consented, 
and thereby submitted to any government, where he 
has made no Expressions of it at all. And to this 
I say, that every Man, that hath any possession, 
or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any 
Government, doth thereby gives his tacit consent, 
and is as far forth obliged to obedience of the 
laws of that government. 22 
Locke, like Madison, held to a theory of tacit consent, 
which prudently imparted to society a measure of social 
stability. 
It seems clear that Madison knew Locke's works 
intimately. One scholar has noted that with some 
reservations, "Locke was indeed the prime source" of 
Madison's principles. 23 However, critics of Madison such 
as Charles Beard, James McGregor Burns, Robert Dahl and John 
Patrick Diggins, have thought differently. They point to 
21 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, Madison to 
Jefferson, 4 February 1790, 232. 
22 John Locke, Two Treatises, 2:8:119:355-356. 
Emphasis is in original. 
23 Marvin Meyers, Mind of the Founder, xxv. 
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Madison's constitutional structure of elaborate checks and 
balances, "auxiliary precautions," and the extended republic 
argument as evidence of his desire to thwart majority rule. 
Viewing Madison through contemporary eyes, Beardian 
pluralists have described Madisonian politics as a system in 
which political authority is divorced from economic power, 
and where majorities cannot directly exert their will. Much 
of this criticism is valid, viewed in today's context, but 
by the same token this line of reasoning fails to assess 
accurately what Madison had in mind. These critics portray 
Madison as concerned, above all, with protecting property, 
in particular the privileged economic status of the upper 
class. Diggins argues that "Madison feared a 'common 
motive,' the same 'passion' and 'interest' (the right of 
property) taking hold of a dominant faction as desirous of 
possessing property as the minority is of preserving it." 24 
To prevent occurrence of such an event, and to also protect 
the property of the elite, "the liberty of the majority" 
must be frustrated so its will was not expressed 
directly. 25 
It is doubtless that Madison was a staunch supporter of 
property. As Edward McNall Burns has noted, property was 
24 John Patrick Diggins, "Power and Authority in 
American Politics," American Historical Review, 86.4 
(October 1981), 701-730, 710. 
25 Ibid., 710. 
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almost an obsession with him. 26 Federalist 10 remains a 
poignant reminder of Madison's adherence to property 
protection. Protection of the diverse faculties of man from 
which the rights of property originate, he insisted, "is the 
first object of government. " 27 In Federalist 54, Madison 
reminded his readers that "government is instituted no less 
for protection of property than of the person of 
individuals." 28 In the Constitutional Convention, he 
warned of a "leveling spirit" which might lead to agrarian 
laws infringing on the rights of property. 29 He also 
fought stay laws and legislation that "impugned the sanctity 
of contracts," both of which aided the wealthy. 30 
According to Diggins, the text of The Federalist 
26 Edward McNall Burns, James Madison: Philosopher of 
the Constitution (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 70. 
27 The Federalist Papers, 10:78. 
28 Ibid., 54:339. 
29 James Madison, Notes, Constitutional Convention 
Speech, 26 June 1787, 194. 
30 Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 41. Irving 
Brant has argued that Madison's support for such matters did 
not come from personal motives; rather his personal economic 
situation might have benefitted from inflationary policies. 
See Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:363. Edward McNall Burns 
also refutes the idea that Madison's object in fighting such 
laws was his own gain. He wanted measures enacted which 
banished unwholesome activity and create an atmosphere 
favorable for men of "industry and prudence." Rather than 
give carte blanche security to the wealthy, Madison wanted 
to impart to each farmer, merchant or small manufacturer, 
the rewards of their own thrift and labor. Madison also felt 
such measures contributed to disunionist tendencies. See 
Burns, James Madison: Philosopher of the Constitution, 45 
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advocated an idea of property contrary to the revolutionary 
tradition. Ideas about property revealed in the 
Declaration, Diggins insists, are replaced in the 
Constitution with new theories. Diggins explains this shift 
in terms of an embrace of (David) Humean concepts, in 
particular his stress upon a person's right to use 
.government to exclude others from obtaining wealth. This 
view of property, Diggins argues, replaced Locke's theory 
which stressed every person's right to property. In Diggins 
view, the Constitution abolished the broad definition of 
property that incorporated life and liberty, as well as 
estates. In its stead, he asserts the authors of The 
Federalist reduced property to economic pursuits. 31 In the 
specific case of Madison, Diggins argues that he rested 
property not on a specific value of labor whereby man 
"wrests" things out of their natural condition which imparts 
value into the object, but on vague "faculties" of acquiring 
it, which in a Humean sense "could mean anything from skill 
to steal th. 11 32 
Drawing heavily on the Federalist for evidence, 
however, distorts Madison's view of property. While Madison 
was an ardent defender of the rights of property, he did not 
collaborate solely with the "haves" against the "have nots." 
31 John Patrick Diggins, "Power and Authority in 
American History," 707-709. 
32 Ibid., 709. 
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Furthermore, Madison did view property in the Lockean sense, 
despite Diggins assertions to the contrary. A study of his 
private and public writings over an expanded time period 
exposes the lopsided nature of interpretations by Diggins, 
Dahl and others who rely solely on the Federalist. 
It was James Madison in the early 1780s who stubbornly 
.fought during the western land controversy to eliminate the 
claims of land speculating companies to tracts of land 
beyond the Appalachians. Although the ownership of such 
companies rested mainly in elite hands, Madison fought their 
claims because a magnificent gem--the public domain--would 
pass "from the public to a few land mongers. " 33 The idea 
of gaining wealth other than through labor appalled Madison. 
A view of his political economy, influenced by both 
republican and liberal ideas, contradicts the idea he 
approved of acquiring property by "stealth."34 Madison 
looked to farmers as the bulwark of the republic. 35 
Similarly, his desire to discriminate between original and 
current holders of government bonds revealed his distaste 
for stockjobbers. Madison's contempt for legislators who 
bought stock in the First Bank of the United States further 
33 JM, Madison to Joseph Jones, 17 October 1780, 2:137. 
34 For more information on Madison's political economy, 
see chapter iv. Also consult Drew McCoy's Elusive Republic. 
35 James Madison "Republican Distribution of Citizens," 
National Gazette, in Marvin Meyers', Mind of the Founder, 
241. 
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revealed his lack of respect for anyone who gained wealth in 
such an "underhanded manner." "Of all shameful 
circumstances of this business," he insisted: 
it is among the greatest to see the members of the 
Legislature who were most active in pushing this 
Jobb [sic], openly grasping its emoluments .... The 
stockjobbers will become the praetorian band of 
the Government-at once its tool & its tyrant ... 36 
In Lockean terms, Madison had no respect for those who 
earned money in such an unnatural manner. 
Furthermore, Madison never held to a narrow economic 
definition of property. He equated liberty with property, 
and often linked the terms together. During the Revolution, 
he reported to Edmund Randolph the effects of the rebellion 
abroad. Ireland, he asserted, had reaped the benefits of 
American resistance. "The shackles are taken off the poor 
Catholicks [sic] in the articles of religious worship and 
the tenure of real property." 37 While the Irish had gained 
other benefits, he focused on the natural rights attained, 
freedom of property and freedom of conscience. Madison also 
reminded Congress in 1789, as he initiated the Bill of 
Rights legislation, that government was instituted for the 
benefit of the people. Such benefits consisted of "the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring 
and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining 
36 JM, Madison to Jefferson, 10 July 1791 and 8 August 
1791, 14:43, 69. 
37 Ibid., Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 23 July 1782, 
4:432. 
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happiness and safety." 38 Edward McNall Burns, by no means 
a defender of Madison, has admitted that "in good Lockean 
fashion he [Madison] coupled property with liberty as the 
great natural rights. " 39 
Support for property had more than a material hold on 
Madison. By holding property and other rights as natural, 
Madison put them on a pedestal upon which he hoped to hoist 
freedom of conscience. Understanding the depth to which 
Americans were committed to natural rights, Madison knew if 
conscience could be considered a natural right it therefore 
gained the same protection as property and other fundamental 
rights. In this respect, Madison went beyond Locke. 
The persecution of Baptists in Virginia in the 1770s 
first revealed Madison's affinity for the rights of 
conscience. In 1774 he confided to Pennsylvanian William 
Bradford that Virginia lacked that "liberal, catholic, and 
equitable way of thinking," which characterized Bradford's 
province. 40 Possessed of the right of conscience, the free 
Pennsylvanian people, Madison believed, had produced 
material as well as spiritual benefits for that state. 
Commerce and the arts had flourished in this society where 
freedom encouraged "continual exertions of genius." 
39 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 8 June 1789, 12:200. 
39 Edward McNall Burns, James Madison: Philosopher of 
the Constitution, 92. 
40 JM, Madison to William Bradford, 1 April 1774, 
1:112. 
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"Industry and Virtue" he remarked, "have been promoted. " 41 
Madison had not yet explicitly linked conscience to natural 
rights, but he had tied the faculty which produced property-
-industry--with freedom of thought. 
In the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1775, 
Madison was a junior member. Too shy to enter into debates, 
he offered only a few suggestions. In the end his 
contribution was but one sentence in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights. With the help of Patrick Henry, 
Madison attempted to insert into the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights a provision disestablishing the Anglican Church and 
providing for the free exercise of religion. Henry's 
chameleon character caused him to withdraw his sponsorship 
when opposition to the amendment materialized. Madison thus 
had to be satisfied with changing the wording of the 
Declaration concerning religious freedom. In place of 
toleration Madison suggested "free exercise" of religion. 
This change of phraseology, in Madison's mind, "declared 
freedom of conscience to be a natural and absolute 
right. " 42 This appears to be the first tangible example of 
Madison's thought linking natural rights and freedom of 
41 Ibid., 112. 
42 James Madison, "Autobiography" William and Mary 
Quarterly, 2.1 (April 1945), 191-209, 199. 
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conscience. 43 
Madison, in this instance, demonstrated how far apart 
his conception of natural rights was from the majority of 
Virginians. Most accepted the idea of toleration, which at 
that time meant acceptance of some form of "Christian or 
Protestant State. " 44 But Madison went far beyond this 
narrow view. Indeed, on matters of conscience he was closer 
to the radicalism of Tom Paine, who held that "toleration is 
not the opposite of intolerance, but it is the counterfeit 
of it .... The one assumes the right of withholding liberty, 
the other of granting. " 45 
Madison, then, traveled beyond Locke, whose notion of 
religious liberty varied little from the concept of 
tolerance for different sects of Christians held by the 
majority of Americans. 46 He stretched the doctrine of 
natural rights to include freedom of conscience. While 
adhering in letter to natural rights, he also tried to 
transcend the limitations imposed on conscience by Locke. 
The 1785 establishment controversy in Virginia 
43 Robert S. Alley, "The Despotism of Toleration'' in 
Alley, ed., James Madison: On Religious Liberty (Buffalo: 
Prometheus Books, 1985), 147. 
44 Ibid. , 14 8 . 
45 Thomas Paine, quoted in ibid., 148. 
46 For a thorough examination of Locke's concept of 
toleration, consult Stanford Kessler's "Locke's Influence on 
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 
Journal of Church and State, 25.2 (1983), 231-252. 
i 
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provided an example of Madison hoisting conscience onto the 
sacred plateau of natural rights. The key plank of his 
"Memorial and Remonstrance" based freedom of conscience on 
natural right. 47 Madison deplored establishment because it 
infringed on a principle, which "is in its nature an 
unalienable right." Referring to the state's Declaration of 
.Rights, Madison maintained that the legislature could not 
infringe this right because it was beyond its authority to 
encroach on a "fundamental right," which, "if we recur to 
its origin, it is the gift of nature." 48 As Rhys Isaac has 
noted, Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" is explicitly 
contractual. Madison held that human society was an 
association, "in which individuals' rights and obligations 
would be regulated by terms on which they entered the 
founding compact. " 49 Violation of the social compact in 
this matter led the reserved Madison to indicate that he 
would support those who disobeyed the establishment law, 
should it pass . 50 
Madison's role in passage of the Bill of Rights 
represented his greatest effort to enshrine the doctrine of 
47 T. Daniel Schumate, ed., "Introduction," The First 
Amendment: The Legacy of George Mason (Fairfax, VA: George 
Mason University, 1987), 57. 
48 James Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance," in 
Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder 9, 15, 16. 
49 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 292. 
50 JM, Madison to James Monroe, 21 June 1785, 8:306. 
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conscience alongside that of property as a "fundamental 
right." Although initially reserved about an addition of a 
bill of rights, viewing it as an attempt to fundamentally 
change the Constitution, Madison became the force that 
carried the bill to its passage. Charges followed passage 
of the Constitution which insinuated Madison had "ceased to 
be a friend to conscience," and subsequently led to his 
campaign promise to press for a bill of rights. 51 The 
notes for his Congressional speech in which he introduced 
the Bill of Rights underlines his commitment to natural 
rights. 52 It was the only section in the notes that 
received such emphasis. Reinforcement of inalienable rights 
was, for Madison, the Bill of Rights' central purpose. As 
he told Congress, the rights that needed protection were 
those "which seem to result from the nature of the 
compact. " 53 Moreover, Madison's greatest disappointment 
with the Bill of Rights stemmed from the striking out of his 
own amendment which restricted states from infringing the 
rights of conscience, speech, press or right of jury trial. 
The loss of this amendment "conceived ... to be the most 
valuable on the whole list," restricted the federal 
government, but not the states, from invading fundamental 
51 Ibid., Madison to George Eve, 2 January 1789, 
11:404. 
52 Ibid., Notes For Congressional Speech, 8 June 1789, 
12:194. 
53 Ibid, Congressional Speech, 8 June 1789, 12:204. 
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rights. To Madison the oversight was glaring.s4 
In a 1792 article for the National Gazette, Madison 
shifted his attention from merely stating that conscience 
was a natural right to proving it. In "Property" he made 
clear his understanding of the relationship between property 
and conscience. The seeds of this relationship (which he 
had hinted at in his earlier letter to William Bradford) now 
came to full fruition revealing a broad definition of 
property very similar to Locke's.ss The right of 
conscience and property were intertwined. Violation of one 
caused desecration of the other. 
"Property" is the quintessential piece of Madison's 
liberal philosophy. This essay, like his other works 
regarding conscience, was written in the natural law 
tradition.s6 In it he defined property, "in its larger and 
juster meaning" as a concept which embraced "everything to 
which man may attach a value and have a right, and which 
leaves to every one else the like advantage."s7 Madison 
noted that man's property extended beyond tangible things. 
"In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his 
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his 
s4 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 17 August 1789, 12:344. 
ss See note 39 for Madison's letter to Bradford. 
s6 Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the American 
Constitution, 120. 
s7 JM, "Property" 27 March 1792, 14:266. Emphasis in 
original. 
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rights. " 58 To emphasize the importance of the latter half 
of his maxim, Madison characterized conscience as "the most 
sacred property of all ... the exercise of that right being a 
natural and unalienable right." 59 Government must, 
therefore, protect equally conscience and property. A 
government that protects only the right to property, and not 
.Property in rights was not just. As Neal Riemer has argued, 
there is no mistake more profound than identifying Madison's 
view of property as strictly economic and conservative. 
Madison did not see government's role as guarding the 
wealthy against the poor. Property, both the right to and 
protection of, deserved security because it was a natural 
right. 6° Conscience, likewise, deserved the same 
protection since it derived from the social compact. In so 
far as the latter has become, at least in public rhetoric, a 
principle equal to other natural rights in American society, 
it has done so largely through Madison's efforts. 
Madison's belief in the protection of natural rights 
also led to his firm stance for minority rights. Classical 
republican doctrine stressed suppression of minority rights 
for the "sake of the public good. " 61 Such a doctrine was 
58 Ibid, 266. 
59 Ibid., 266. 
60 Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the American 
Constitution, 122. 
61 Gordon Wood, The Creation of The American Republic, 
1776-1787, 62. 
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anathema to Madison. The doctrine of minority rights is 
sprinkled throughout his writings. Madison's fear of 
majority tyranny is most concisely summed up in a letter to 
George Washington written shortly before the Constitutional 
Convention. "The majority who alone have the right of 
decision have frequently an interest real or supposed in 
abusing it." 62 The majority must rule, but majority rule 
had boundaries which it could not overstep. The cure for 
such a problem, according to Madison, consisted of founding 
a "stable government not infringing fundamental rights. " 63 
The Constitution, for the most part, fit Madison's 
description. His concern for minority rights anticipated 
Tocqueville's critique of a conformist American society by 
forty years. Yet his doctrine of minority rights is neither 
conservative nor aristocratic. It is simply an affirmation 
of Locke's thesis that civil society should never infringe 
fundamental rights. Contrary to pluralist opinion, Madison 
was not allied with upper classes in an effort to oppress 
the majority. Indeed, when one analyzes how Madison put his 
doctrine of minority rights into practice it is the upper 
classes he aligned against. 
Madison belonged to the gentry class, but he was not in 
solidarity with it. At the Constitutional Convention, he 
62 JM, Madison to George Washington, 16 April 1787, 9: 
385. 
63 Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 19 March 1787, 9:318. 
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opposed property qualifications for elected officials. 
There he noted that "landed possessions were no certain 
evidence of great wealth." The unjust laws of the various 
states "proceeded more often from this class of men [large 
land owners] than any others." 64 Seven years later in 
Congressional debates taxation, Madison called for taxes on 
luxuries. Referring his colleagues to the words of Thomas 
Paine, Madison described "a great estate" as the greatest 
luxury. 65 
Madison, furthermore, participated in struggles against 
his own class. As a foremost supporter of the Baptists in 
Virginia, he helped deal a blow to gentry dominance in that 
state. Although he professed no affection for Baptist 
"enthusiasm," he (and his father) fought for, and provided 
protection for them on occasion. 66 As a vestryman, the 
senior Madison enforced church discipline. One of the 
vestryman's most important duties consisted of putting 
Baptists in jail for preaching without licenses. In this 
distasteful task James Madison, Sr. refused to take part. 67 
Rather than discouraging Baptist activities' like a good 
vestryman should have, he tolerated, and even allowed, 
64 James Madison, Notes, 26 July 1787, 375. 
65 JM, Congressional Speech, 2 May 1794, 15:321-322. 
66 James Madison, "James Madison's Autobiography," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 198. 
67 Irving Brant, James Madison, 1:52. 
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Baptist meetings near his own home. Indeed, in May of 1771, 
four to five thousand Baptists assembled at Blue Run Church 
in Orange County. While this meeting was near the Madisons' 
estate, they made no effort to stop it, a passive but bold 
statement of the family's support for the Baptists. 68 
The younger Madison's service for the Baptists, 
however, went far beyond his father's. As legislator and 
pamphleteer Madison's opposition to Episcopal establishment 
initiated a fight for freedom of conscience that had broad 
social implications. Rhys Isaac has noted that the 
established church composed "an integral part of the fabric 
of colonial Virginia society and its system of 
authority. " 69 And the Baptist challenge to the elite was 
not treated lightly by Virginia gentry. Establishment had 
the support of the cream of Virginia's gentry, among others, 
George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee. 
Yet, Madison's Lockean principles caused him to fight his 
own class and defend the right of an embattled social 
minority. If other members of the gentry knew that the 
establishment controversy contained implicit social 
implications, Madison doubtless also knew; but he chose to 
join those working to break the gentry monopoly on political 
power. The result of this struggle saw the ascendancy of a 
68 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-
1790, 192, and Irving Brant James Madison, 1:70. 
69 Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790, 
157. 
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contractual conception of authority at the expense of the 
old social authority of patriarchy in Virginia. The 
principle of individual autonomy began to change "late 
eighteenth-century Anglo-Virginians' perceptions of the 
world and the expectations they had of it. 1170 Madison 
played an important role in this transformation. 
His battle for other minorities such as Catholics, 
Jews, and Quakers, carried itself into Congress. In 1790, 
Catholics in America numbered approximately thirty five 
thousand out of a population just under four million. 71 
Persecution had erupted during the Glorious Revolution and 
sporadically throughout the eighteenth century wars between 
Britain and France, as well as after passage of the Quebec 
Act. Virginia proved one of the worst offenders against 
Catholic liberties. Besides suffering disenfranchisement, 
Catholics were prevented from acting as guardians, or 
serving as witnesses. They were barred from settling in 
large groups, owning horses worth more than five pounds, or 
possessing firearms. 72 Although the Revolutionary alliance 
with France helped ease some fears, "socially speaking, 
Catholics endured as a suspect minority." 73 In 1790, 
70 Ibid., 311. 
71 John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956), 42. 
72 Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-
1860 (New York: Rhinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), 10. 
73 Ellis, American Catholicism, 42. 
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Catholics enjoyed civil liberties in only five out of 
thirteen states. The eruption of anti-Catholic prejudices 
in the 1840s could not have occurred without Americans being 
steeped in the anti-papal tradition. 74 
James Madison's support for Catholics, conversely, 
stretched back to the 1780s when he served as a member of 
the Virginia House of Delegates. In an unsuccessful bid to 
convince the House to amend the Virginia Constitution, 
Madison listed as one of the document's defects the 
exclusion of "papists and recusants" from the franchise. 75 
Later in 1794, when Representative Samuel Dexter of 
Massachusetts ridiculed the idea that Roman Catholics could 
become attached to republican principles, Madison defended 
them. Catholicism was not inherently anti-republican, 
Madison countered. Pointing to the democratic character of 
the Swiss Cantons, many of which were Catholic, he argued 
there was nothing inconsistent with their religion and the 
"purest republicanism." Many Catholics had proven 
themselves in the recent struggle with England, and thus, he 
pointed out, deserved the title of "good citizen. " 76 
Madison also championed the rights of Quakers and Jews. 
He believed firmly in the rights of conscientious objectors. 
74 Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1. 
75 JM, Notes on Virginia Constitution, 14 June 1784, 
8:78. 
76 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 1 January 1795, 15:432-
433. 
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In introducing the Bill of Rights, Madison had attached to 
the amendment concerning the right to bear firearms a clause 
which stated no person religiously opposed to bearing arms 
"shall be compelled to render military service in 
person." 77 Having failed in this instance, Madison tried 
again, in Congressional debates over the militia, to secure 
an exemption for Quakers. He proposed that all persons who 
claimed exemption from military duty because of religious 
beliefs should present a certificate indicating their church 
membership. Instead of service, Madison proposed that each 
would pay a sum of money, although his personal preference 
was that the "exemption should be made gratuitous. " 78 
Madison's bill again failed to become law, but it provides 
another example of his commitment to minority rights. 
In 1790 population estimates of Jewish Americans 
numbered between 1500 and 2000. Although American Jews 
fared better than their counterparts in Europe, even Rhode 
Island, the most liberal of all the colonies, treated them 
as strangers, refusing them the right to naturalization. 79 
At the time the Constitution was passed, only Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, and Georgia had 
77 James Madison, Congressional Speech, 8 June 1789, in 
Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, 216. 
78 JM, Congressional Speech, 23 December 1790, 13:330. 
79 Morton Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 24. In 
1761, Rhode Island officials denied two Jews applications 
for naturalization. 
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repealed onerous civil restrictions on Jews. Ironically, it 
took Maryland, founded as a haven for those religiously 
persecuted, twenty seven years of continual referendums on 
the "Jew law" to pass it. 8° Federalist attacks on 
Jeffersonians between 1795 and 1800 appealed at times to 
anti-semitic prejudices. 81 Jews, like Catholics, were 
victims of deep seated suspicions. 
But despite wide spread anti-semitism, American Jews 
found a friend in James Madison. He wrote occasionally to 
Jews "expressing his respect for their fortitude and 
patriotic attachment to the United States. " 82 As a member 
of the Continental Congress Madison at times received 
financial aid from Haym Solomon, who refused "obstinately" 
all repayment. 83 In 1818, Mordecai M. Noah wrote to 
Madison thanking him for his service to the Jews, in 
particular his fight for religious freedom. Madison's 
support, Noah testified, was an important reason that he and 
other members of his faith had reaped many blessings since 
so Ibid., 37-40. 
81 See Morris U. Schappes, "Anti-Semitism and Reaction, 
1795-1800" in Abraham Karp, ed., The Jewish Experience in 
America 3 vols. (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1969), 1: 
362-390, for a sampling of Federalist propaganda attacks 
containing anti-Jewish messages. 
82 Robert Ketchum, "James Madison's Religion," in 
Robert Alley, ed., James Madison: On Religious Liberty, 185. 
83 Abraham Karp, ed., The Jewish Experience in America, 
I: xxii. 
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coming to America. 94 With the notable exception of 
Indians and blacks, Madison had a deep concern for 
minorities existing on the margins of the American society, 
and this concern was an important aspect of his liberal 
ideology. Majority rule must always respect the fundamental 
rights of all, including socially ostracized groups. 
Madison fought for equal rights on behalf of several 
minorities, opposing at times his own class. All must have 
an equal right to property, as well as a property in rights. 
Madison's opposition to majority rule was hardly 
undemocratic. His doctrine of minority rights posited that 
a system of popular government that failed to protect 
natural rights was tyranny clothed in a different manner. 
While the theory that popular majorities can abuse power has 
gained acceptance as a maxim of American political thought, 
Madison has received little credit for it. Madison fought 
tyranny wherever he found it. He feared tyranny of any 
kind, whether by the few or the many. "As Madison never 
tired of insisting, the rich could oppress the poor, the 
poor could injure the rich, merchants could harm the 
farmers, and farmers could damage merchants. " 95 He 
championed the individual and his rights to economic, 
political, religious, and intellectual freedom. The 
94 Ibid., 359. 
95 Neal Riemer, James Madison: Creating the American 
Constitution, 122. 
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Constitution, hardly a perfect document to Madison's mind, 
attempted to reconcile this tension within Locke's doctrine 
between majority rule and individual rights. Madison 
understood that ill use of power, either personal or 
political, "could cut many ways." 86 He wanted a system of 
government strong enough to govern effectively, but not so 
.powerful that it could jeopardize the natural rights of 
individuals. In this regard, it may be that Madison was too 
Lockean. He believed majority rule could exist with 
adequate protection for minorities of all classes and 
beliefs. Madison held that a system of popular government 
drawing solely on the sovereignty of a heterogenous people, 
combined with a diffused balance of power among the various 
governmental branches, could govern effectively and secure 
fundamental rights. 87 Critics may object to Madison's 
methods--that is, his means of securing majority rule with 
safety for minorities--but not his end. If Madison's 
theories for joining majority rule with minority rights has 
proven archaic in today's world, his goal remains valid. 
Any system of rule that stifles or fails to protect 
individual development deserves no one's approbation. 
Scholars have overlooked the democratic character of 
86 Ibid., 122. 
87 For a fairly recent interpretation that argues for 
The Federalist's concern for republican government and 
popular sovereignty, consult David F. Epstein, The Political 
Authority of the Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1 9 8 4 ) . 
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Madison's theory of minority rights. Instead of looking at 
his theory in action, they mistakenly derive his doctrine 
from class status. This same type of narrow interpretation 
has hampered understanding of another aspect of Madison's 
liberal ideology, that which follows from his analyses of 
"faction" and "interest". 
Madison's theory of interest and faction, as he 
developed it in The Federalist, has received considerable 
attention from scholars. It has been viewed in basically 
two different manners. The republican view, that of Gary 
Wills and Gordon Wood, maintains that The Federalist's 
emphasis on the multiplicity and interplay of interests 
allows for the negation of interests to the end of promoting 
the public good.BB In contrast, pluralists such as Laski, 
Bentley, Lippman and others, while acknowledging Madison's 
dark view of interest and faction, contend that the 
structure of government and politics he espoused was 
essentially modern.B 9 Publius-Madison, they held, 
recognized the interest-oriented nature of man and 
championed a republican system in which government provided 
the arena for competing interests to vie for ascendancy. 
Thus one school sees Madison conceiving government's role as 
BB The best example is Garry Wills' Explaining 
American: The Federalist. 
B9 See Paul F. Bourke's, "The Pluralist Reading of 
James Madison's Tenth Federalist," for a concise analysis of 
this interpretation. 
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blocking interests, while the other depicts it as 
recognizing faction and providing the framework for interest 
competition. Both describe Madison as viewing interest in a 
negative manner. 
As such both views reveal the danger of interpreting 
Madison solely through The Federalist. The same Madison who 
argued pessimistically in the Federalist 10 that the power 
of self-interest was so strong "it is in vain to say that 
enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing 
interests" was the same man who stated before the House that 
"the great principle of interest is a leading one with 
me. " 90 One remark painted interest as negative force, the 
other celebrated it. Evidence exists that casts a cloud 
over the image of interest portrayed in The Federalist. 
Indeed, as legislator, Madison showed that investigating and 
promoting the interests of one's constituents was important 
to him. 
The need to know the interests of a legislator's 
constituents prompted Madison, during Congressional debates 
in 1783 over a commercial treaty with Great Britain, to 
request "that the commercial interests of Virginia [be] 
thoroughly investigated & the final sense of the state 
expressed to its representatives." 91 Madison saw nothing 
90 The Federalist, 10:80; JM, Congressional Speech, 21 
April 1789, 12:99. 
91 Ibid., Madison to Edmund Randolph, 20 May 1783, 
7:59. 
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wrong with verifying Virginia's interests in the matter and 
then articulating them to Congress. In fact, as a member of 
the Continental Congress, the protection of Virginia's 
interests in the navigation of the Mississippi and the 
western land controversies displayed Madison's firm 
commitment to his state's "distinctive interests. 1192 The 
French Minister, Chevalier de La Luzerne, noted that despite 
Madison's devotion to France, his honest character, and 
desire "to do good works, ... he is not free from prejudices 
in favor of the various claims of Virginia." 93 Similarly, 
in 1791 Madison refused to present an anti-slavery Quaker 
petition to Congress, because such a request would cause him 
to violate the interests of his constituents, from whom "I 
derive my public station." Replying to Quaker John 
Pleasant, Madison refused to make "use of my situation ... to 
become a volunteer in giving a public wound, as they [his 
constituents] would deem it, to an interest on which they 
set so great value." 94 Madison even promoted slavery, an 
92 Lance Banning, "James Madison and the Nationalists," 
William and Mary Quarterly 40.2 (April 1983), 228. The 
first part of Banning's article provides a concise account 
of Madison's involvement in the dispute over western land 
claims, as well as the fight to secure free navigation of 
the Mississippi. 
93 Quoted in Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:14. 
94 Ibid., Madison to Robert Pleasants, 30 October 1791, 
14:91. Madison also refused to present the petition on the 
grounds it would do more harm than good. Analyzing the 
present climate of opinion, Madison thought reaction to 
Quaker petitions might lead to restrictions on the rights 
presently enjoyed which allowed an individual to free their 
93 
institution he et~ically despised but did little about, to 
preserve the interests of Virginia citizens. 
If representatives were to promote interests, 
government, moreover, was bound to protect interests and to 
insure all segments of society were represented. In 1785, 
Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation for its 
failure to protect interests. "The suffering part, even a 
minor part, can not long respect a government which is too 
feeble to protect their interests." 95 During the 
Constitutional Convention, Madison declared that "it was 
politic as well as just that the interests and rights of 
every class should be duly represented and understood in 
public councils." 96 
As these passages indicate, it is clear that Madison 
believed interest must have a voice in government. To 
guarantee that American's republican government understood 
and represented the interests of a heterogenous society, 
Madison advocated a detailed census. When the census bill 
was introduced in January of 1790, Madison confided to 
Jefferson that it provided "a kind of information extremely 
own slaves. His prediction proved true. The continued din 
for manumission led to an 1806 act by the Virginia 
legislature which required that free slaves "leave the 
commonwealth within twelve months." JM, Editorial Note, 
14:92. 
95 Ibid., Madison to Monroe, 7 August 1785, 8:334. 
96 Ibid., Constitutional Convention Speech, 26 July 
1787, 10:117. 
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requisite to the legislator, and much wanted for the science 
of political economy. 1197 An enlightened Madison proposed, 
therefore, a schedule that distinguished between gender, 
age, and race, as well as one that specified "the number of 
persons employed in different professions and arts ... such as 
merchants, mechanics, manufacturers, etc., etc." 98 To 
Madison such detail was vital. "Descriptions of the several 
classes into which the community was divided, he insisted, 
should be accurately known. " 99 Armed with such 
information, legislators could then "make proper provision 
for the agricultural, commercial and manufacturing 
interests. 1110° Furthermore, as the country grew, he 
asserted a thorough census would allow legislators "an 
opportunity of marking the progress of the society, and 
distinguishing the growth of every interest. 11101 Against 
critics of the proposed census, Madison gave no ground: 
In order to accommodate our laws to the real 
situations of our constituents, we ought to be 
acquainted with that situation. It may be 
impossible to ascertain it as far as I wish, but 
we may ascertain it so far as to be extremely 
useful when we come to pass laws affecting 
97 Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 14 February 1790, 
13: 41. 
98 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 26 January 1790, 
99 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 25 January 1790, 
9. 
100 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 26 January 1790, 
101 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 25 January 1790, 
9. 
13:9. 
13:8-
13:9. 
13:8-
95 
particular descriptions of people. 102 
To bolster his case further, he pointed to recent bills 
passed by the House concerning the manufacturing, 
agriculture and commercial sectors of society. If Congress 
had the benefit of census information, he held, his fellow 
representatives could have based their arguments on facts, 
not conjecture . 103 
Evidence such as this leads one to question the 
interpretation of Madison devising the Constitution to 
thwart interest. If anything, he did his best to insure 
that various interests made their way to the national 
government. Yet by the same token a modern, pluralistic 
interpretation of Madison as interest broker does not 
accurately describe the views he expressed outside of The 
Federalist. The world of modern politics was alien to 
Madison, and thus he did not hold that the public good 
102 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 2 February 1790, 13:15-
16. Madison also incorporated a suggestion from 
Massachusetts Representative, Theodore Sedgwick, into the 
census bill. Sedgwick wanted to include a schedule that 
included identification of the professional trades, clergy, 
physicians and lawyers. Madison replied he had no 
objections to including the learned trades, but was wary of 
including clergy since "the general government is proscribed 
from interfering, in any manner whatsoever, in matters of 
religion.'' Madison's detailed schedule was, to his 
disgust, thrown out by the Senate. JM, Madison to Jefferson, 
14 February 1790, 13:41. 
103 JM, Congressional Speech, 2 February 1790, 13:16. 
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resulted from the natural competition between interests. 104 
His liberal orientation was, at every turn, tempered by his 
republican ideal of the "public good," and informed by the 
eighteenth century concern that man's tendency to self 
interest, when pushed to extremes, perverted the natural 
order. 
One thus finds in Madison's discourse a curious, and at 
first glance contradictory, blending of interest and the 
public good. In 1782, Madison complained that a lack of 
knowledge about state interests hampered Congressional 
action on currency problems. The lack of information "in 
all questions relative to this subject, makes it difficult 
for us to deduce the general interest from a just and fair 
comparison of particular interests. 11105 Here and 
elsewhere, Madison linked the public good, "the general 
interests," to an adequate knowledge of "particular 
interests." For example, at the Virginia ratifying 
convention, he supported election of the president by the 
electoral college because it satisfied the conflicting 
interests of the large and small states and in doing so, he 
104 Gordon S. Wood, "Interest and Disinterestedness in 
the Making of the Constitution," in Richard Beeman & et. 
al., eds. Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution 
and American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987), 96. 
105 JM, Madison to Edmund Randolph, 3 December 1782, 
5:357. 
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reasoned, accomplished the public good. 106 
Concern for the general interest also induced Madison 
in 1794 to reject the interests of merchants in discussion 
over commercial discrimination. He did not object to their 
interests being voiced, but he maligned the attitude of 
Congressmen who treated merchants' opinion in matters of 
trade as "oracles." Such conduct seemed unthinkable to 
Madison, since representatives of the House were bound to 
watch over the "joint concerns of the whole. " 107 
Madison's definition of interest thus does not fit 
neatly within the pluralistic paradigm. He confided to 
James Monroe in 1786 that no maxim appeared more misapplied 
than "the current one that the interest of the majority is 
the political standard of right and wrong." If one took the 
word" 'interest' as synonymous with 'ultimate happiness' in 
which sense it is qualified with every necessary moral 
ingredient," he granted that the idea was true. However, by 
taking interest in the popular sense, "as referring to 
immediate augmentation of property and wealth, nothing can 
be more false." 108 Interest, to be effective and just, 
must align with the needs of the whole. A balance between 
self-interest and the public good must be struck. 
106 Ibid., Speech at the Virginia Ratification 
Convention, 11:154. 
107 JM, Congressional Speech, 31 January 1794, 15:236. 
108 Ibid., Madison to Monroe, 5 October 1786, 9:141. 
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In the last example, one finds traces of Publius-
Madison. Interest taken to its extreme led to tyranny. 
When interest super-seceded reason, it took on its evil 
nature, faction . 109 
Madison surmised that interest, within its proper 
sphere, deserved the full attention of government. Guided 
by reason, and a knowledge of interests, not only of one's 
constituencies but of the entire nation, elected officials 
could "deduce the general interest from a just and fair 
comparison of particular interests."110 With such 
knowledge, as the basis of reflection and debate, Madison 
believed that legislators could reach a consensus on just 
what constituted the "public good." Obviously, this mode of 
interest expression was politically deferential. Madison 
advocated investigation and vocalization of interests, but 
did not guarantee that government would recognize the 
validity of any specific interest. Government's role 
consisted of merging interest and the public good onto a 
middle ground whereby the antithetical nature of the two 
disappeared. 
How does one reconcile the Madison who denounced 
"faction" in The Federalist with the Madison who maintained 
109 Daniel Howe, "The Political Psychology of the 
Federalist," 485-509. 
110 James Madison, "Republican Distribution of 
Citizens," National Gazette, in Marvin Meyers, Mind of the 
Founder, 241. 
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that the public good could not be discerned without intimate 
knowledge of the interests of the nation? Perhaps 
resolution of the dilemma centers on seeing The Federalist 
as Madison's portrayal of government functioning at its 
worst, that is when interest has usurped reason in the minds 
of elected officials. Publius-Madison stressed the 
reliability of a system which had its own built in check 
against self aggrandizement. One finds Madison, in the 
midst of party strife five years after passage of the 
Constitution, reiterating his assertion that the best 
provision for a stable government rested with "an 
equilibrium in the interests and passions of the Society 
itself ... " 111 Yet Madison's statements only admit that 
diversity of interests provided security for republican 
government. He does not admit that it is the best way to 
govern. It is now known that The Federalist was aimed at 
the elite, educated parts of society. 112 Publius' goal was 
to convince members of the upper class that their status and 
property could still remain secure under the Constitution, 
even if "enlightened'' (upper class) leaders were not at the 
helm. Obviously, the essays had a more partisan character 
than is currently acknowledged. 
111 JM, Notes for National Gazette Essays, 19 December 
1791--3 March 1792, 14:158-59. 
112 See Daniel Howe's, "The Political Psychology of the 
Federalist," 485-509; and Albert Furtwangler's, The 
Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984.) 
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As Garry Wills has pointed out, development of a 
political system that treats every man as a knave does not 
necessarily imply that only selfish goals exist. Rather 
such a strategic presumption allowed Madison to talk of 
safeguards without precluding virtue. 113 Madison's theory 
of interest reflected his ideas about human nature, most 
succinctly expressed in Federalist 55: 
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which 
requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust, so there are other qualities in human 
nature which justify a certain portion of esteem 
and confidence. 114 
If The Federalist dwelled on the negative aspects of 
interest, Madison enunciated in other writings the positive 
side. In these latter instances he portrayed a symbiotic 
relationship between interest and the common good. Interest 
must always be tied to the public good, but cognizance of 
the public good rested on an intrinsic knowledge of 
interest. 
113 Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist, 192. 
114 The Federalist Papers, 55:346. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SUI GENERIS MADISON: A PRUDENT POLITICAL ECONOMY 
In his theory of interest Madison fused strands of 
.republican and liberal ideas, indicating that he did not 
find the two paradigms incompatible. Not surprisingly, 
historians have started to see things from a Madisonian 
viewpoint. Recently, historians have approached an uneasy 
consensus between liberal and classical interpretations of 
the founding period. Both sides have backed away from 
earlier assertions that one or the other ideology dominated 
the American revolutionary and founding era. Lance Banning, 
for example, has admitted that he and other historians of 
classical republicanism have over-emphasized the importance 
of these doctrines and slighted the presence of Lockean 
ideas. 1 Many scholars now agree that a variety of political 
languages were present during this time. Isaac Kramnick has 
identified four ideologies which contributed to a "profusion 
and confusion of political tongues among the founders." 2 
The correct view is that there was no homogenous political 
1 Lance Banning, "Jefferson Ideology Revisited: Liberal 
& Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 43.1 (January 1986): 3-19, 12-15. 
2 Isaac Kramnick, " 'The Great National Discussion': 
The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 4. 
language at the time, and that to educated men use of one 
ideology seemed compatible with the use of others. 3 
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The previous chapters have examined the ways in which 
Madison's thought coincided with classical and liberal 
creeds. Yet if both ideologies existed in his mind, it 
follows that they were interwoven. This is evident in his 
views on political economy, which display his molding and 
merging of different political languages into one. In the 
end, this is to say, Madison's writings blended classical 
with liberal ideas, to the end of promoting a society which 
freed the individual to fulfill his economic potential, and 
yet consulted the public good. As Madison himself 
testified, "the citizens of the U.S. know that their 
individual interest is connected with the public 
[interest] . " 4 
From the early 1780s through 1795 Madison worked to 
remove the shackles from an American economy dependent on 
British credit, merchants, and ships; instead, as a 
legislator he promoted a society compatible to the American 
"genius." A study of Madison's thought on political economy 
during this time shows him synthesizing strands of different 
theories. He incorporated those ideas into an ideology 
conditioned to the realities of American society. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 JM, Congressional Speech, 9 May 1789, 12:146. 
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Before looking at Madison's legislative attempts to 
secure the American republic, it is instructive to outline 
his view of the ideal society. His support for free trade 
was one of the most consistent themes of his ideology. In a 
1785 letter to James Monroe, for example, Madison confided 
to his friend that "a perfect freedom is the system which 
would be my choice." During a Congressional speech four 
years later he similarly proclaimed that "commerce ought to 
be as free as the policy of nations will admit." In the 
same vein, throughout the meetings of the third congress 
Madison repeatedly called himself a friend of free trade and 
voiced support for a doctrine "which gives industry a free 
course under the impulse of individual interest and the 
guidance of individual sagacity." 5 
According to Madison, not only did free trade allow 
individuals to pursue their economic goals, it encouraged 
peaceable relations between nations. This communication 
unified trading partners and made them dependent on the 
other's goods. When such a relationship prevailed, he held, 
countries hesitated to declare war on one another, for peace 
served and promoted a nation's commerce. Free trade not 
only liberated the individual but restrained international 
5 Ibid., Madison to Monroe, 7 Aug. 1785, 8:333; Ibid., 
Congressional Speech, 8 April 1789, 12:65. 
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violence, the greatest danger to republican government. 6 
According to Madison, however, free trade alone did not 
in itself sustain republican principles. Commerce must 
carry the goods that resulted from the most exalted of 
occupations, agriculture. To his mind, a robust commerce 
carrying American agricultural produce overseas provided a 
crucial safety valve for republicanism. Agriculture, then, 
provided the foundation for Madison's concept of political 
economy. Agriculture, in his estimation, needed 
encouragement because it constituted "the great staple of 
America." In this regard he agreed with Tench Coxe's 
statement that agriculture was "the spring of our commerce 
and the parent of our manufactures." 7 
This defense of agriculture as the true basis of 
prosperity aligned Madison with the concepts of Adam Smith 
and the French physiocrats. Madison and Smith stood for the 
producer of natural goods, foodstuffs. In the Wealth of 
6 Ibid, Notes for a Congressional speech, 9 April 1789, 
12:68, and Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character: The Anglo-
American as New Model Man," William and Mary Quarterly, 36. 
no.1 (January, 1979): 14-15. Lerner provides a concise 
account of this contemporary idea that commerce would induce 
more pacific relations between nations. He points out that 
Hamilton was the ''outstanding demurrer" to this concept. 
Hamilton believed free trade ideas nonsense because they 
lacked an understanding of the true nature of commercial 
relations between nations. 
7 Ibid, Congressional Speech, 9 April 1789, 12:71, and 
Tench Coxe, "An Enquiry into the Principles on Which a 
Commercial System for the United States should be Founded," 
(June 1787), quoted in Cathy Mason and Peter Onufs' "Toward 
A Republican Empire: Interest and Ideology in Revolutionary 
America," American Quarterly, 37.4 (1985) :496-531, 524. 
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Nations, Smith asserted that the rapid progress of Americans 
resulted from their ability to concentrate their capital in 
agriculture. 8 French physiocrats held that agriculture was 
more natural and valuable to a nation than an obsession with 
manufacturing luxuries. 9 
It is important to point out that the type of 
agriculture Madison advocated was not limited to subsistence 
farming. The whole purpose of free trade was to take 
advantage of the fact that Americans produced far more than 
they needed. This surplus would be shipped to countries 
needing essential staples. In the last part of the 
eighteenth century, the growth of markets in Europe and the 
West Indies prompted American farmers to pursue a mixed 
husbandry, in particular wheat production. 10 While 
8 C.R. Fay, "Adam Smith, America, and the Doctrinal 
Defeat of the Mercantile System," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 48 (1933-34): 304-316, 313-314. 
9 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 52. 
10 Joyce Appleby, "Commercial Farming and the 'Agrarian 
Myth' in the Early Republic," Journal of American History, 
68.4 (March 1982): 839-840. The importance of the wheat 
market had a personal effect on Madison. In a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson in June of 1793, Madison asked for his 
friend's comments on a system of crop rotation he had 
formed. The number of acres of wheat planted each year, 
according to Madison's system, was double that of any other 
crop. JM, Madison to Jefferson, 29 June 1793, 15:40-41. 
Joyce Appleby points out in, Capitalism and a New Social 
Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s, 43, the city of 
Baltimore arose in the 1790s from the grain trade. Two 
centers of raising and marketing agriculture produce, 
Philadelphia and New York, grew at a rate almost double that 
of the rest of the nation. This work of Appleby's and the 
other cited above have gone a long ways towards correcting 
the assumption that because the Jeffersonians championed 
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classical republicans feared this kind of prosperity because 
it led to accumulations of wealth and luxury, and thereby 
accelerated the decline of the body politic, Madison saw 
surplus crops as a positive measure of the individual 
industry of the American people. The demonstrated 
productive capabilities of American farmers, in turn, 
reinforced Madison's belief that industry and labor, in most 
circumstances, should be left alone. Not even the wisest 
legislature could create, through legislation, a more 
favorable atmosphere for labor than nature. 11 
While Madison rejected a classical view of subsistence 
agriculture production he still retained classical ideas 
about the relationship between independence and property 
ownership. In classical ideology the vitality of republican 
government rested on a foundation of independent landowners. 
Each was capable of providing for their own needs, and each 
zealously guarded the political liberty produced by their 
economic independence. When an individual became dependent 
agriculture they adhered to a backward looking ideology 
while the Hamiltonians are viewed as advocates of modernity. 
This is assumption that McCoy's Elusive Republic builds on 
in characterizing the Jeffersonians as followers of 
classical republican ideals. As Appleby correctly points out 
in the "Agrarian Myth," the battle between the Jeffersonians 
and the Federalists should be seen as a struggle between two 
different ideas of capitalistic development. Historians, 
like McCoy, living in an industrial age see the 
Jeffersonian's enthusiasm for agriculture as an attachment 
to the past and those who advocated a manufacturing-
financial political economy as progressive. 
11 JM, Congressional Speech, 9 April 1789, 12:71. 
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on another for subsistence, that person also lost his 
political liberty. The larger the number of people who 
lacked independence, the greater the likelihood of 
corruption. In this regard Madison aligned himself with 
classical theories. 
Madison believed that republican government needed to 
rest on a foundation of independent people who supplied 
their own needs. Like other classical republicans, he felt 
that when people were independent they jealously guarded 
their liberty and republican government. Thus, in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, he remarked that the 
freeholders of the United States provided the "safest 
depositories of Republican liberty." 12 Occupations to be 
avoided "consisted of those that make one class of citizens 
dependent on another." 13 Madison reiterated the political 
and economic importance of an independent citizenry in a 
March 5, 1792, article for the National Gazette entitled 
"The Republican Distribution of Citizens.'' "The class of 
citizens who provide at once their own food and their own 
raiment," he held, "may be viewed as the most truly 
independent and happy. They are more; they are the best 
basis of public liberty and the strongest bulwark of public 
12 James Madison, Notes, 403. 
13 JM, "Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792, 
14:20. 
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safety. " 14 For Madison, the freedom and happiness of 
American society increased in proportion to the agricultural 
segment of the population. 
In a different vein, however, Madison looked at the 
role property played in securing republican government in a 
way that diverged markedly from the classical concept. The 
classical conception of property viewed land not as a means 
of making money, but rather as a way of "anchoring the 
individual in the structure of power and virtue, and 
liberating him to practice these ideas." 15 Possession of 
ample land allowed certain citizens enough wealth to spend 
the majority of their time engaged in securing the common 
good through politics. On the other hand, when Madison 
referred to freeholders as the most secure source of 
political liberty, he alluded not to owners of vast estates 
who lived off the proceeds of their land; rather Madison 
celebrated the families who worked their land and who reaped 
the benefits of their own labor. In contrast to British 
laborers toiling in degrading, dependent employment in 
manufacturing, Madison gloried in "the independent situation 
and manly sentiments of American citizens, who live on their 
own soil," and "whose labor is necessary for its 
14 Marvin Meyers, ed. The Mind of the Founder, 242-243. 
15 Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 9. 
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cultivation ... " 16 American society would continue to grow 
as individuals labored on their property to produce surplus 
natural goods. Virtuous conduct and industry, therefore, 
naturally emanated from a Republican government which 
allowed citizens the freedom necessary to develop their 
faculties. 
Yet, if the American economy was to be based on 
aggressive exporting of agricultural goods, there needed to 
be the means available to transport the goods in ship 
bottoms other than foreign ones. Madison advocated the 
creation of a large merchant fleet to streamline the flow of 
American foodstuffs overseas. In a speech to Congress in 
May of 1789, he declared himself a friend of shipping. 
"I .... shall be always ready to go to as great [of] lengths 
in favor of that interest as any gentleman on the floor." 17 
A month earlier, Madison had attacked a proposal to place a 
heavy duty on hemp because such a measure threatened the 
shipbuilding industry. 18 Besides securing independence for 
American goods transported overseas, the presence of a 
sizeable fleet provided protection for American coasts in 
time of war, and also promoted industry. Because America 
16 JM, "Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792, 
14:258. Emphasis in the quote is mine. 
17 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 4 May 1789, 12:120. 
Madison's enthusiastic support for an expanded American 
merchant fleet should dispel any lingering visions of 
Madison as a supporter of yeoman agriculture. 
18 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 16 April 1789, 12:84. 
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shipped bulky products, which required more room in ship 
holds than manufactured goods, Madison reasoned that as 
.Americans produced more goods for export their shipping 
capacity must also grow. 19 Economic opportunities would 
abound for those who ventured to build ships and carry 
.American goods, and Madison meant to encourage such 
ventures. 
Manufacturers also appeared prominent in Madison's 
ideal society, but in a secondary role to agriculture. For 
him, manufactured goods should not become the object of 
export trade, but rather provide a source of essentials for 
farmers. Madison remarked that the United States was 
fortunate because "so much of the ordinary and most 
essential consumption takes place in fabrics which can be 
prepared in every family, and which constitute, indeed, the 
natural ally of Agriculture. The former is work within the 
doors, as the latter is without." 20 The utility of 
manufacturers was based not only on their ability to supply 
necessities, but also to the degree they helped promote 
republican society. Manufacturing occupations which were 
"least favorable to vigor of body, to the faculties of the 
mind, or to the virtues or to the utilities of life, ... ought 
to be seen with regret, as long as occupations more friendly 
19 Ibid., 3 Jan. 1794, 15:169-170. 
20 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Republican 
Distribution of Citizens," National Gazette, 5 March 1792, 
242. 
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to human happiness lie vacant." 21 The occupations Madison 
indicted above possessed a high division of labor and, 
therefore, revealed the existence of a subservient wage 
labor force. These manufacturers usually did not provide 
necessities, but rather unneeded luxuries. These 
occupations proved the "least desirable in a free state" 
because one class of citizens' livelihood depended on the 
whim of those who consumed the items they produced. 
Manufacturers were welcome only if they produced necessary 
goods. Wage labor, however, which large manufacturers 
depended on, was not to become a mainstay of the America 
economy, for it threatened the citizen's independence, and 
hence the nation's republican character. 
This, then, provides a rough outline of Madison's ideal 
society. Based on a thriving, export-oriented agriculture, 
whose products made their way to Europe in the bottoms of 
America ships, it manufactured only goods necessary for a 
society of independent farmers. Republican government 
provided the foundation. It gave the agriculture-based 
citizenry the freedom needed to allow industry to flourish 
and prosperity to grow. Ownership of, and labor on, one's 
own land secured economic and political freedom, and in turn 
insured that citizens would guard the society responsible 
for their freedom. Madison in this way grafted liberal 
ideas of free, self-seeking individuals to classical 
21 Ibid., 243. 
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concepts of property and independence. The outcome was a 
society which combined liberty and industry with the virtues 
of republican government. 
Unfortunately for Madison, America in the late 
eighteenth century hardly resembled the society he wanted. 
The Revolution had done little to remove American commercial 
dependence on Great Britain. British merchants and ships 
still dominated American commerce. English manufacturers 
dumped their goods on American markets without penalty, 
while American goods entering British ports confronted high 
duties. Direct trade with the West Indies, the colonies' 
most lucrative market, remained closed after the Revolution. 
All the while, the newly independent states seemed more 
prone to bicker among themselves about commercial 
regulations than in working to remove the chains tying 
American trade to British policies. Commercial affairs, 
Madison worried, demonstrated a "want of concert in matters 
where the common interest requires it. " 22 Furthermore, in 
Madison's opinion, government both under the Articles and 
for a short time after ratification of the Constitution 
stood on the edge of bankruptcy. Revenue was needed to pay 
debts and restore honor to the American government. 
From 1783 to 1795, the struggle to free America from 
its bondage to Britain and reinvigorate the national 
22 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Vices of 
the Political System of the United States," 85. 
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treasury occupied the majority of Madison's time. Despite 
his approval of free trade, historical circumstances forced 
him to promote quite different measures to secure his 
country's commercial independence and financial stability. 
The fundamental interests of America, he insisted, could not 
be sacrificed at the altar of free trade. Implementation of 
free trade, above all, must wait until other nations, 
especially the British, abandoned their restrictive trade 
policies. It was also unwise to attempt a policy of free 
trade when duties on imports provided an attractive method 
for raising funds to pay off war debts and rescue a 
floundering treasury. Theoretical ideas had to be adjusted 
to reality. 
Madison, therefore, advocated mercantilistic measures 
to regulate foreign trade and navigation, with an eye 
towards breaking the British monopoly and guiding American 
goods into more "natural channels." He hoped to use 
commercial discrimination, a form of economic coercion, in 
place of war to break the British stranglehold. To 
complement his policies of discrimination, Madison proposed 
duties on imported goods. To this end, he devised a prudent 
ideology of political economy to secure, in the long run, 
free trade and an independent American commerce. The means 
he advocated mixed together mercantilism and tenets drawn 
from classical republicanism. Madison meant to realize a 
liberal objective through reliance on regulatory measures. 
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The final success of his policies, however, rested on the 
virtue of the people. Madison believed the populace would 
support and endure any hardships caused by his policies 
because the measures promoted "the public good." 
Madison's first attempt came with the Virginia Port 
Bill, which he introduced in the Virginia House of Delegates 
in 1784. The bill sought to create established ports of 
entry in Virginia from which foreign ships were required to 
discharge and load their cargo. The bill had several 
purposes. First it was meant to provide Virginia with 
adequate import and export facilities. 23 Second, it sought 
to facilitate collection of duties and reduce smuggling. It 
would also secure for the Virginia treasury the tribute of 
thirty or forty percent the importing merchants from 
Baltimore and Philadelphia had demanded from the state to 
bring goods there. If Virginia charged the same duties and 
that money was channeled into the treasury, Madison 
believed, it would yield a "surplus above all its wants. " 24 
Keeping British captains out of riverside warehouses, 
however, comprised the most important reason for the bill's 
introduction. British ships dominated the commerce strewn 
throughout Virginia's many river ports. The bill intended, 
above all, to restrict the trade of Great Britain to the 
23 At this time Virginians were dependent on importing 
merchants from those cities, many of whom were British, or 
who had British sympathies. 
24 Irving Brant, James Madison, 2:310. 
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same level as other foreign nations, who lacked the means to 
control as many ports as the British. Furthermore, Madison 
hoped to prevent the recurrence of the "Scotch Monopoly," 
which provided initial favors to Virginia planters, but 
ended with the farmers deeply in debt to British 
interests. 25 Restricting the British to certain ports gave 
,local shipping an opportunity to develop in areas that 
foreign vessels could not go, and freed farmers from the 
unrepublican specter of debt. 
Passing of the Port Bill proved quite a struggle. Ports 
not named in the bill protested vigorously. Madison hoped 
to name only Alexandria and Norfolk as established ports of 
entry, but opposition forced him to add York, Tappahannock 
and Bermuda Hundred. Discreet advocates of the British 
monopoly joined forces with merchants interested in 
maintaining the status quo. They, in turn, enlisted the 
support of planters who wanted ships at their own 
wharves. 26 Madison's reaction to them proved quite 
instructive. 
In the midst of debate an exasperated Madison 
complained to Jefferson that opponents of the measure 
attacked the bill for violating the concepts of free trade. 
These critics charged the bill restricted the gifts nature 
had bestowed upon Virginia. Madison's scorn for his foes 
25 Ibid., 315. 
26 Ibid., 315. 
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was quite apparent. Opponents, he charged, deluded the 
people into not seeing the measure's purpose and necessity, 
the liberation of trade from the British monopoly. "They do 
not serve the public good," he observed, "only their own 
interest." 27 Against his critics, Madison maintained that 
the bulldog grip the British had on American commerce 
required extraordinary measures. Although a firm advocate 
of free trade, Madison did not hesitate to abandon the 
principle when the larger "public good" so dictated. In 
this respect narrow, individual interest had to be harnessed 
to the larger interests of the whole. Free trade could not 
become a reality until American commerce was free and 
Britain recognized reciprocity in trade. The Port bill was 
Madison's first attempt to realize this goal. 
The Port Bill gave Madison only a shallow victory. He 
had hoped the bill would encourage other states to implement 
similar policies, but his message went unheeded. A year 
after the passage of the Port Bill, Madison complained to 
James Monroe that American "trade was never more completely 
monopolized by Great Britain ... than it is at this 
moment." 28 Two months later a frustrated Madison wrote 
again to say he would agree to anything if the state 
legislatures would just give Congress the power to regulate 
27 JM, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 27 April 1785, 
8:100-102. 
28 Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 21 June 1785, 8:307. 
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trade. He promised that in order to get the states 
compliance, he would agree to more frequent Congressional 
elections, an increase in Congressional numbers, shorter 
terms for members, and allow no regulatory trade bill to 
become law unless passed by a majority of the states. 
Madison felt lawmakers had their priorities backward. They 
feared giving Congress the power to regulate trade more than 
the threat presented by the British monopoly, a grievous 
error to his mind. However, representatives on the state 
and national level felt otherwise, causing a distraught 
Madison to plead with them "not [to] sacrifice the end to 
the means. 1129 Having failed to gain regulatory power for 
Congress under the Articles, Madison urged creation of a new 
system that had the power to deal with the British menace. 
The calling of the Constitutional Convention provided 
Madison the opportunity to correct many flaws he saw in the 
Articles. The lack of a central power to regulate trade was 
an, if not the most, important one. Madison confided to 
Jefferson in March of 1786 that "in fact most of our 
political evils may be traced to our commercial, as most of 
our moral to our political. 1130 To his mind government's 
role in a free society consisted of acting as a neutral 
29 Ibid., Madison to James Monroe, 7 August 1785, 
8:334. 
30 Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 18 March 1786, 8:502. 
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arbiter between its citizens. 31 Yet he realized a national 
government must have the power to deal with foreign nations, 
especially those who applied restrictive and unfair trade 
practices. The states had failed miserably in their attempt 
to deal with commercial matters. Madison felt it was time 
to create a national government, and provide it with power 
to solve the country's commercial woes. "If it be necessary 
to regulate trade at all it is necessary to lodge the power, 
where it can be regulated effectively." 32 In this regard, 
Madison was a rarity in Southern politics. Unlike many of 
his fellow Virginians, he trusted a national government to 
draft trade regulations that would benefit all. 33 
In the Constitutional Convention the discussion of the 
proposed government's power brought major disagreements, 
both sectional and ideological, to the surface. During the 
discussion of duties and impost regulation, Madison's fellow 
Virginian, George Mason, urged the Convention to incorporate 
31 On government acting as a neutral arbiter between 
interests see Meyers' Mind of the Founder, 96, which 
contains an April 16, 1787 letter of Madison's to 
Washington. In it Madison revealed that republican 
governments to date had lacked "some disinterested and 
dispassionate umpire" to settle disputes. See also ibid., 
244, for Madison's article "On Property" in which he 
concludes that a just government is one which "impartially 
secures to every man whatever is his own." The emphasis is 
Madison's. In addition consult Isaac Kramnick's "The 'Great 
National Discussion': The Discourse of Politics in 1787," 3-
32, especially pages six and seven. Kramnick makes an 
argument similar to the one outlined above. 
32 JM, Madison to Monroe, 7 Aug. 1785, 8:333. 
33 Ibid., Editorial Note, 8:406-408. 
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into the Constitution a resolution forbidding the new 
government to tax exports because such a duty would fall 
heaviest on the South. Madison quickly challenged Mason. 
He asserted that the new government should have the power to 
tax exports. This power should not be yielded for it 
provided the government with a possible source of revenue. 
Furthermore, it was only right that Southerners bear the 
lion's share of an export tax. Madison believed funds 
raised through such a tax were necessary to finance naval 
protection of ships carrying mostly Southern goods. 34 Five 
days after his rebuttal of Mason, Madison again argued for 
the power to tax exports. He claimed export duties "may not 
be expedient at present", but like imports they may have to 
be regulated in order to gain revenue, encourage domestic 
manufacturers, and, most importantly, procure "equitable 
regulations from other nations." 35 The seeds of Madison's 
commercial discrimination policy can be seen in this remark 
made during the Constitutional Convention. The policy would 
blossom and then wither during Madison's years as a 
Congressman. 
Despite Madison's failure to secure Congressional power 
to tax exports, the new Constitution did give Congress much 
34 James Madison, Notes, 467-468. 
35 Ibid., 499-500. Later that same day a motion passed 
which said that no tax should be laid on exports. Virginia 
voted with the majority with two dissenting voices, 
Washington's and Madison's. 
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greater power to regulate trade than had the Articles. Once 
passage of the Constitution was assured and after Madison's 
election to a seat in the House, he immediately renewed his 
effort for regulatory measures. 
During the first session of Congress in 1789 Madison 
proposed impost duties to raise money for the treasury. In 
the debate, Madison urged his fellow Representatives to look 
after local interests, but also to consider "the general 
interest of the Union. " 36 He criticized representatives 
who proposed a drop in impost rates on goods consumed 
primarily in their constituency. All, he insisted, must pay 
an equal share, for republican government was based on the 
premise that it "will equally effect all. " 37 Madison 
rebuked those who argued that a duty on Jamaican rum would 
cause people to start smuggling the spirit as they had 
during British rule. He could not believe "the virtue of 
our citizens is so weakly fortified." 38 He defied 
comparisons between an unfair British tax and a just 
American one. The people would comply because they saw a 
just end for the measure, stability for the Treasury. While 
generally pleased with the outcome of impost rates, Madison 
criticized the inability of some Representatives to look 
36 JM, Congressional Speech, 9 April 1789, 12:70. 
37 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 29 April 1789, 12:119-
120. 
38 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 24 April 1789, 12:108. 
beyond the scope of their local interests. 
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Such attitudes 
caused the duties to lean toward local interests "at the 
expense of the general interest. " 39 The debates over 
duties clearly revealed the classical side of Madison, one 
concerned deeply with the "public good", and one willing to 
enact regulatory measures in order to secure the interests 
of all. 
Emotions ran high as Congress debated the second half 
of Madison's revenue making measure, which called for a 
tonnage duty, discriminating between ships from nations who 
had a commercial treaty with America, and those who did not. 
As Drew McCoy has pointed out, the purpose of the bill 
centered on removing British domination through 
discriminatory commercial legislation. 40 It provided a 
prime example of Madison adopting mercantilist measures to 
secure free trade and tying, ultimately, the success of his 
measures to the citizens' virtue and frugality. That is to 
say, classical ideas provided the means to a liberal end, 
free commerce. In the test of wills between the British and 
American people, Madison believed, furthermore, the 
republican character of the latter's people insured they 
would endure hardship and deprivation of a trade war better 
than their British counterparts. 
In introducing the measure on April 8, 1789, Madison 
39 Ibid., Madison to Tench Coxe, 24 June 1789, 12:257. 
40 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 138. 
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outlined several purposes. The tonnage duties, he argued, 
would reduce the imbalance of trade with Great Britain. 
While American ports remained open to all English goods, 
Britain refused to recognize a reciprocal policy towards the 
United States. As a result of the trade imbalance caused by 
this policy, commerce between the two nations exceeded "what 
.may be considered its natural boundary. " 41 British trade 
policies killed competition and allowed British imports to 
exceed American exports by large amounts. Once natural 
competition resumed, or a set of equally restrictive trade 
measures were enacted, the ratio of imports to exports would 
balance out. Britain, in addition, had continued to close 
the West Indies to direct American trade, one of the most 
natural and important outlets for American goods. Thus, 
according to Madison, until the British retracted their 
extreme mercantilist policies, America must adopt the same 
measures to protect its own interests. Throughout, Madison 
maintained his adherence to free trade, but English policies 
forced him to propose measures designed to restrict the 
British, and secure American commercial independence. 42 
41 JM, Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 30 June 1789, 
12:269. 
42 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 21 April 1789, 12:102. 
The idea that commercial discrimination could bring Britain 
to its knees was not new. McCoy, in the Elusive Republic, 
143, points out that Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations 
mentioned the British economy was vulnerable to the type of 
scheme that Madison introduced fifteen years later. Whether 
Madison got his idea from the Wealth of Nations, remains 
unclear. However, Madison had read Smith's book. While in 
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The Tonnage discrimination bill also intended to 
encourage .American shipping. According to Madison, ships 
built and owned by Americans would pay a smaller duty than 
foreign ships. Southerners charged that higher duties 
placed too great a burden on them. Madison replied that the 
measures would hurt the South only for short time, until 
American shipping had grown enough to handle the bulk of 
Southern produce. 43 The end result would benefit "the 
common good" of the entire nation, releasing .American 
farmers from their dependence on British bottoms, cheapening 
the transportation of .American goods, and providing 
protection for the coast. The small sacrifice the South had 
to endure, he argued would, in the long run, provide 
benefits run not only for the section, but for the entire 
nation as well. 44 By acting for the common good now, 
citizens could at a later date enjoy the freedom to pursue 
their interests. 
In addition, Madison believed than an enlarged 
.American shipping fleet held out other advantages, above all 
the opening of the French market for .American goods. 
Madison's leaning towards France in foreign economic policy 
Paris Jefferson received a letter from Madison asking to buy 
for him a collection of tracts on French Economics that were 
"much referred to by Smith on the wealth of nations." JM, 
Madison to Jefferson, 27 April 1785, 8:266. 
43 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 5 May 1789, 12:134-135. 
44 Cathy Mason and Peter Onuf, "Toward a Republican 
Empire," 515. 
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antedated the Revolution. 45 Looking to break the English 
monopoly by also exploiting other markets, his proposed 
tonnage duties would invigorate trade with an ally depressed 
"beyond what nature deserves. " 46 Even the small amount of 
commerce that made its way to France went via England, 
proving to Madison that "American commerce flows in an 
improper channel" and demanded rectification. 47 
Elimination of artificial obstructions between original 
production and final consumption created a truly "natural 
economy." 48 Madison confided a similar thought in a letter 
to Jefferson. "American trade will not be in its proper 
channels until it should flow directly to the countries 
making the exchange." 49 
Discriminatory tonnage duties, then, would hinder 
British mercantile interests, force reciprocity, break down 
barriers that kept American commerce from flowing (according 
to Smithian laws of political economy) to its most "natural" 
markets, and promote the growth of an American fleet. 
American shipping would allow its citizens to take advantage 
45 Madison's bias towards France is further evidenced 
by his decision in 1792 to accept an offer of citizenship 
granted him by the French Government. 
46 JM, Congressional Speech, 4 May 1789, 12:129. 
47 Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 30 June 1789, 12:269. 
48 Cathy Mason and Peter Onuf, "Toward a Republican 
Empire," 510. 
49 JM, Madison to Jefferson, 30 June 1789, 12:269. 
of other markets, especially France, and at the same time 
increase the nation's safety and economic independence. 50 
125 
If Madison's goals seemed admirable, many questioned 
the effectiveness of commercial discrimination and the 
ability of the republic to withstand a trade war with Great 
Britain. Would discriminatory tonnage rates, some asked, 
really free American trade and provide the initiative for 
development of a commercial fleet? What adverse effects, 
asked others, would result if his plan failed? Northeastern 
commercial interests, in particular, opposed Madison's 
measures. They worried that Great Britain might respond by 
cutting off all trade with the United States. America, they 
held, was too dependent on Great Britain to risk offending 
her. 
Madison, on the other hand, saw things differently. 
Great Britain needed American trade more than America needed 
Great Britain's. He had no fear of British retaliation. 
"Her interests can be mortally wounded, while ours are 
invulnerable. " 51 According to Madison, America supplied 
agriculture products to the British Empire, necessities of 
life, while Americans received in return superfluities, 
manufactured luxury goods. British manufacturers and 
laborers depended on American consumers and if an economic 
war occurred, American consumers could, by adopting frugal 
50 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 125. 
51 JM, Congressional Speech, 4 May 1789, 12:127. 
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habits and ceasing to buy British goods, throw English 
laborers out of work. By the same token, the lack of 
American foodstuffs would cause food shortages in portions 
of the British Empire, eventually forcing the British to 
accede to the republic's demands. 52 The surplus produced 
by independent American farmers, furthermore, would always 
secure a permanent market, unless the people of a European 
nation decided to stop eating. Clinching the case for 
Madison was his belief that "the produce of this country is 
more necessary to the rest of the world than that of other 
countries ... 1153 
In the event of a trade war with Great Britain, Madison 
similarly held, these natural advantages, combined with the 
virtue of the American people, insured victory. Knowing 
that the struggle was for the "public good" the citizens of 
the United States would endure the burdens of an embargo 
better than their British counterparts. 54 Mercantilist 
measures united with the virtue and frugality of the 
American people formed the basis of Madison's plan to 
liberate the commerce of his nation. But despite his 
eloquent arguments for discriminatory tonnage duties, the 
Senate, in June of 1789, struck out the clause that 
52 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 125, 140. 
53 JM, Congressional Speech, 26 April 1789, 12:112. 
54 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, "Political 
Observations," 2 April 1795, 294. 
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differentiated between nations in treaty with the U.S. and 
nations who were not. Fear of the British retaliation 
proved too strong, and commercial discrimination died. 
Defeated in his first attempt, Madison resurrected his 
discriminatory policy four years later when British actions 
against American commerce again aroused public passions. 
Looking again to secure a doctrine of free trade, he 
advocated the same type of regulatory measures and stressed 
reliance on the republican character of the citizenry. When 
England and France once again turned to military force to 
settle their differences in 1790s, the conflict provided 
Madison with his opportunity. 
As conflict between France and England began anew, 
Britain insured that relations with the U.S. would also 
flare up by adopting policies that struck hard at American 
commercial interests. France's fear that the West Indies 
would be blockaded by the British led them to open the 
French West Indies to "neutral" American ships, which had 
not been the case before the war. London's attempt to block 
the opportunistic French ploy led to passage of the odious 
Orders in Council. Passed in June and November of 1793, the 
orders were immediately provocative. The June Order allowed 
the British to seize and purchase the cargoes of neutral 
ships bound for French ports, or those under French control. 
While it hurt the pride of American ship captains to have 
their vessels arbitrarily boarded and searched by British 
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naval officers, no monetary losses took place. The second, 
however, gave British captains the authority to detain and 
confiscate neutral ships carrying the produce of a French 
colony, or supplies used by such a colony. In short order, 
the British seized about three hundred vessels, throwing 
their crews into foul jails or "inviting" them to join the 
British Navy. 
To Madison it was apparent that the havoc the Orders in 
Council played with American trade in the West Indies 
manifested the "ill will and contempt of Great Britain 
towards us." 55 A diplomatic agreement remained out of 
reach. The missions of John Adams and Thomas Pinckney had 
failed to secure any good. American diplomats sent to 
London were frozen out, making them, according to Adams' 
dispatches, "as insignificant here as you can imagine. " 56 
To change the intolerable attitude of the British required 
harsh measures. 
Acting to implement Jefferson's 1793 report on the 
state of American Commerce in Foreign Countries, Madison 
introduced in the House seven resolutions designed to create 
a policy of commercial discrimination. His underlying 
assumption was the same as 1789, and he relied on the same 
arguments, with one new addition. 
55 JM, Madison to Horatio Gates, 24 March 1794, 15:287. 
56 John Adams to John Jay, quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, 
A Diplomatic History of the American People, 8th edition, 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 55. 
Discrimination, Madison again argued, would work 
because Great Britain was more dependent on the United 
States than America was on England. Discrimination would 
also succeed because of the virtue and frugality of the 
American people. 57 Finally, Madison's prudent policy 
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provided a middle way. It preserved the national honor by 
acting against Great Britain, but did so short of war, 
something dangerous to republican government and something 
for which America was ill-prepared. 
In considering the import and tonnage duties to be 
placed on foreign vessels originating from a country who did 
not have a commercial treaty with the United States, 
Madison again urged his fellow Congressman to remember that 
"small local sacrifices must be made to obtain a greater 
good." 58 The higher the duties and tonnage fees the 
clearer the message sent to Great Britain. 
This time discussion of import and tonnage duties did 
not produce the heated debate they had in 1789; instead 
Congressmen clashed mainly over the practicality of 
Madison's proposals. Massachusetts Representatives Samuel 
Dexter and Fisher Ames, along with Thomas Fitzsimmons of 
57 As he had in 1789, Madison argued for discrimination 
because of the benefits American shipping would receive. Yet 
he used this line of reasoning less than in 1789, possibly 
because Madison did not want to encourage Federalist ideas 
that called for a buildup of the American Navy. See JM, 
Congressional Speech, 3 January 1794, 15:169. 
58 JM, Congressional Speech, 6 Feb. 1794, 15:248. 
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Pennsylvania and William L. Smith of South Carolina, proved 
Madison's most vocal opponents. They held to the Federalist 
line that discriminatory measures would cause a trade war 
with Great Britain. Such an event, they insisted, would 
cripple .American trade, but cause little damage to the 
British Empire. 
Madison, in response, argued that something had to be 
done to the British. The world would be a wonderful place 
if nations, like the British, tore down their trade 
barriers. However, America could not adopt a policy which 
did not exist anywhere else. 59 The trade imbalance and 
British high handed seizures on the open sea had to be 
stopped. 
In 1794, as in 1789, Madison pointed out that England's 
economy was weak because it rested on an unnatural 
foundation . .America's advantages over Britain resulted from 
the country's natural economy and the character of its 
people. Great Britain sent the U.S. "superfluities" or 
luxury goods. As a result, the British economy was 
dependent on the whims of her consumers. 
By 1794 Madison believed he had empirical evidence for 
these perceptions, gleaned from his study of the plight of 
British manufacturing in 1792. His 1792 article for the 
National Gazette, "Fashion" dealt with this topic. 
59 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794, 
15:182. 
In it 
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Madison discussed a petition the Prince of Wales had 
received from the buckle manufacturers in Birmingham, Wassal 
and Wolverhampton. According to the petition, their 
industry stood on the verge of ruin because a change of 
fashion had caused people to start using shoestrings and 
slippers. As a result of this "whim" twenty thousand people 
lost their jobs. The manufacturers implored the Prince to 
help change fashion back in their favor by ordering his 
staff to wear buckles. 
To Madison the story had immediate consequences for 
American foreign policy. The plight of the manufacturers 
and their workers, whose employment came from the 
"precarious source of fashion and superfluity," provided 
both a lesson and an opportunity for Americans. 60 The 
lesson was simple: the more people a nation employed in 
trades dependent on external commerce, the more it became 
dependent on the caprice of other nations. Madison lamented 
the fate of the British worker. "Can any despotism be more 
cruel than a situation, in which the existence of thousands 
depends on one will, and that will on the most slight and 
fickle of all motives." 61 Equally important was the 
opportunity the story pointed to: an economy based on 
manufacturing, which heavily depended on fashion, was, 
60 Ibid., "Fashion," National Gazette, 20 March 1792, 
14:258. 
61 Ibid., 258. 
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Madison believed, susceptible to the measures he proposed to 
Congress in 1794. The unnatural British economy was 
vulnerable because it was dependent. Its foundation rested 
on laborers engaged in wage labor, who had, therefore, 
neither economic nor political liberty. Consequently, their 
existence depended on the manufacturers for whom they 
worked, who in turn, relied on habits of fashion and the 
consumption patterns of foreign nations. A change in 
fashion or a decline in consumption threatened the whole 
false structure. 
Britain's former colonies, to the contrary, exported 
"chiefly the necessaries of life, or raw materials." 
American goods always secured a sure market. America, 
moreover, could do without goods it received from other 
countries "or produce substitutes. " 62 If forced into a 
contest of self denial to protect her national interest, 
"our country may make her enemies feel the extent of her 
power. " 63 In an economic war, he granted, America would 
not emerge unscathed, but if the "virtue and temper of our 
fellow citizens were not mistaken, the experiment would find 
62 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 3 January 1794, 15:169. 
Madison also saw a golden lining in his discriminatory 
policy for manufacturers. He reasoned that if you 
discouraged the manufacturing of one nation you might build 
up your own, and, in fact, encourage manufacturers to move 
to the America, whose burgeoning country might provide a 
lucrative market for the manufacturers. Consult JM, 
Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794, 15:183. 
63 Ibid., 3 January 1794, 15:169. 
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in them a far greater readiness to bear it." 64 Unlike a 
military contest, an economic conflict allowed America to 
fight from a position of strength. 
Another benefit of Madison's policy was, then, the 
ability to avoid military war. By 1794, Britain's arbitrary 
seizures had enraged many to the point of war. Even the 
ardent Anglophile, Alexander Hamilton, considered Britain's 
actions "atrocious" and advised President Washington to 
prepare for war. 65 Madison wanted to punish the British, 
but avoid martial conflict. 
Madison, like all people influenced by classical 
republicanism, knew that "of all the enemies to public 
liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded." 66 It 
provided the impetus for the development of armies, (which 
Federalists were attempting to raise at that time), meant 
higher taxes and increased debt, all instruments of corrupt 
governments intent on tyrannizing the people. To Madison's 
mind, his prudent measures had the advantage of avoiding war 
and fighting a battle on terms which gave America a decided 
edge. In military matters, he advised, England "is an 
overmatch for us." However, in commercial operations, "here 
64 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 14 January 1794, 
15:189. 
~ Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the 
American People, 73. 
66 Marvin Meyers, Mind of the Founder, "Political 
Observations," 20 April 1795, 15:287. 
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the United States are unquestionably an over-match for 
Great Britain." 67 Logically, then, the United States stood 
a better chance of forcing concessions through commercial 
discrimination than by use of military force. 
Madison's proposals met with qualified support 
throughout the nation. Support came from most parts of the 
country. Three American ship captains, languishing in a 
Kingston, Jamaica jail sent Madison a letter supporting his 
resolutions. 68 The letter made its way into many 
newspapers. The momentum commercial discrimination had 
gained, however, quickly waned in early March of 1794, when 
the British seized and condemned one hundred American 
vessels in the West Indies. Sterner measures were needed, 
something even Madison admitted to Jefferson when he 
reported the newest British outrage. 69 In response, a 
thirty day embargo was passed by both Houses. The decision 
by Washington to send a diplomatic mission headed by John 
Jay to solve the crisis followed on the heels of the 
embargo. Jay's mission, for all practical purposes, ended 
67 Ibid., 296. 
68 JM, Madison from Joshua Barney and Others, 13 March 
1794, 15:281-282. The popularity of Madison's proposals can 
also be assessed by the fate dealt to opponents of his 
measures. Representatives Fitzsimmons and Dexter, two of 
the more outspoken opponents, were defeated in their re-
election bid, along with several other Congressmen, 
primarily for their attacks on Madison's policy. See JM, 
Editorial Note, 15:148-149. 
69 Ibid., Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 March 1794, 
15:278. 
Madison's last attempt as a Congressman to implement his 
policy of commercial discrimination. 
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Despite the fact that Madison's ideas never came to 
fruition until Jefferson's presidency, a study of it reveals 
the sui generis nature of his ideology. It shows Madison 
reconciled individual interest with the public good. In 
this regard, a summary of his political ideology is found in 
some comments Madison made to James Monroe in 1785. He 
confided to his friend that he wished for a system of free 
trade, but that before such a reality could occur America 
must first climb out of debt and assure that other nations 
concurred in the policy. 70 The comments reveal, on one 
hand, Madison's wish to free the individual to pursue his 
self interest. As he noted in another context, "the great 
principle of interest is a leading one with me." 71 But by 
the same token Madison understood circumstances would arise 
in which the national interest called for firm regulatory 
measures and required the citizenry to act virtuously. 
Thus he abandoned neither virtue nor interest, but 
blended them together. While historians today continue to 
present classical and liberal republican ideologies as 
antagonistic to each other, Madison's prudent political 
economy provides a clear exception. He felt the people had 
an "enlightened self interest" which allowed them individual 
70 JM, Madison to Monroe, 21 April 1785, 8:333. 
71 Ibid., Congressional Speech, 21 April 1789, 12:99. 
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initiative, but in times of crisis prompted them to 
sacrifice their interests to preserve the government that 
allowed individual freedom. Without liberty virtue could 
not exist, and neither could liberty without virtue. One 
provided freedom, the other protected it. Madison's Port 
Bill, his arguments before and during the Constitutional 
Convention for extensive Congressional powers to regulate 
trade, and his policy of commercial discrimination, arose 
from his belief that they "promoted the public good." They 
fostered the general good because they secured American 
commercial independence, promoted individual interest by 
creating a system of free trade, and provided a means of 
avoiding war. Madison's belief that the people would abide 
by and even support such measures, despite the deprivation 
they suffered, shows how deeply classical republicanism 
affected him. Yet Madison's end was a liberal one. Once 
reached, this goal would leave the citizens free from 
commercial regulations, measures Madison termed himself as 
"generally unjust, oppressive and impolitic." 72 A prudent 
middle way existed between virtue and interest. Exploration 
of this middle way illustrates Madison's ability to 
consolidate fibers from different ideologies and weave them 
into a system uniquely his own. 
72 Ibid., Congressional Speech, April 9, 1789, 12:71. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In early 1792 Madison published an article on the "The 
Spirit of Governments" in the National Gazette. In it he 
reminded his audience that "no government is perhaps 
reducible to a sole principle of operation." 1 Even in 
societies where the previous statement seemed erroneous, he 
noted, oftentimes "different [and] heterogeneous principles 
mingle their influence ... " 2 Historians of Madison's 
thought have, unfortunately, ignored these comments, 
focusing instead on explaining his ideas through singular 
paradigms built on narrow slices of his writings. This 
study, on the contrary, holds that a clearer understanding 
of Madison emerges if one explains his thought through more 
than one paradigm or section of his writings. 
Reducing the mind of Madison to "a sole principal of 
operation" slights the breadth of his study and experiences, 
and discounts the supple nature of his intellect. His 
education, writings, personal library and political career 
reveal the presence of both classical and liberal 
1 Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder "The Spirit of 
Governments," National Gazette, February 20, 1792, 239. 
2 Ibid., 239. 
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convictions and concerns. When he referred to political 
theorists in his writings from 1751-1795, Madison mentioned 
Locke and Montesquieu most often. His comment to Jefferson 
in 1825 that the writings of Sidney and Locke provided 
indispensable information about the cause of liberty was not 
accidental. 3 In referring to these two authors--
representatives of republican and liberal ideologies, 
respectively--Madison testified to the influence of the two 
traditions upon him. 
Narrow interpretations of Madison have encouraged 
narrow readings of Madison. Critics and even admirers of 
Madison view The Federalist as the Alpha and Omega of his 
thought. For many it remains a standard of American 
political theory. Yet the high regard The Federalist 
eventually garnered never permeated Madison's mind. Both 
during and after completion of it, he sought to keep his 
role secret. Even his best friend, Jefferson, did not learn 
of his role in the project until after ratification of the 
Constitution. By that time the essays were published in a 
two volume set, and Jefferson had already learned of his 
friend's participation from other sources. 4 Madison 
revealed his authorship to Jefferson in late 1788. He 
referred to it in a casual way, as something trivial that 
had slipped his mind. "Col. Carrington," he wrote: 
3 Ibid., Madison to Jefferson, 8 February 1825, 444. 
4 Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 47. 
tells me he has sent you the first volume of the 
federalist, and adds the 2d. by this conveyance. I 
believe I never have yet [the rest of the quote is 
in code] mentioned to you that publication. It 
was undertaken last fall by Jay, Hamilton and 
myself. The proposal came from the two former. 
Though carried in concert the writers are not 
mutually answerable for all the ideas of each 
other there being seldom time for even a perusal 
of the pieces by any but the writer himself . 5 
Madison never developed the attachment to The Federalist 
that others, including Jefferson, felt. 6 If Madison 
139 
referred with pride to any of his writings it was "Memorial 
and Remonstrance." One scholar, John Zvsper, has argued 
that much of the writings of Madison-Publius was just 
rhetoric, implying that Madison never really believed much 
of the doctrine contained in The Federalist. 7 While 
somewhat overstated, Zvsper's comments rightly emphasize 
that there is more to Madison's thought than The Federalist. 
There remains, then, the need for more study of 
Madison's political theories. This thesis has attempted to 
explain a slice of his doctrines, and also suggest a new way 
to study him. Social historian Victoria Bonnell has noted 
that in analyzing complex events "a single theory, however 
5 JM, Madison to Jefferson, 11 August 1788, 11:227. 
6 Yet it must also be noted that Madison and Jefferson 
included The Federalist in their list of textbooks for law 
students at the University of Virginia. Along with The 
Federalist, they included the Declaration of Independence, 
the Virginia Report of 1799, and Washington's Inaugural and 
Farewell Speeches, a rather curious assortment of sources. 
Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, 442-446. 
7 John Zvsper, ''The Madisonian Systems," Western 
Political Quarterly 37.2 (1984), 236-256. 
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rich and multi-variate, will seldom suffice. Complex events 
usually have multiple causes ... " 8 To paraphrase Bonnell, 
one might argue similarly that in analyzing complex 
individuals like Madison, no single theory, intellectual 
paradigm or source, no matter how profound, will suffice. 
Complex figures like Madison were influenced by multiple 
theories. 
Perhaps Peter Onuf is right. Scholars grew discouraged 
about the scholarship of the early republic which came from 
the bicentennial because they missed seeing how recent works 
exposed the complexity of the founding period. Instead, 
they eagerly awaited the discovery of a new paradigm hoping 
it would, through a single interpretative lens, neatly 
explain the Constitutional era. The answer, however, may 
lie so close to us that, like the proverbial snake, it waits 
to bite. A thorough study which examines all the sources, 
remains faithful to the historical context of events, and 
which at its inception does not limit itself to one 
explanatory paradigm, may eliminate much of the ambiguity 
which surrounds the founding period, and, more to the point, 
the thought of the nation's the least known but "most 
powerful and probing intellect," 9 James Madison. 
8 Victoria Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Worker's 
Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 
1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.) 
9 Jack N. Rakove, James Madison: And the Creation of 
the American Republic (Glenview, IL: Little, Brown Higher 
Education,) 1990, 181. 
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